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ABSTRACT
TULP, CAROLINE Democratization and Social Movements: An Analysis of Elites
and Masses in Democratic Transitions. Department of Political Science, June 2011.
ADVISOR: Robert Hislope
Over the past several decades there has been an influx of countries becoming
democracies. Post-communist Eastern Europe, developing Africa, and Latin America
are only three regions that have been working towards democratic governments, some
being more successful than others. There are many theories that attempt to explain
why some countries are able to successfully transition to a democracy while others
fail. In my senior thesis, I focus on elitism versus the power of the masses.
For most of transitology history, elites have been viewed as the prominent
actor in democratization. However, the role of the masses has been focused on more
and more as time passes. I examine the histories and democratization processes in
South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti, to determine the influence mass mobilization and
elites have in democratic transitions. Mass mobilization is my independent variable,
the variable that I am studying to see its impact, or lack of, on democratization
processes in various countries.
While the two theories do divulge prominent ideologies, I find that consensual
elites and social movements are both not necessary for a democratic transition, but the
democracy will most likely succeed in the long run if they are present. Therefore
universalism is more supported for the transition process, while in order to
consolidate there are certain preconditions that a country must reach first before
attempting to democratize. Also, in order for a democracy to be successful it needs
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involvement from both the elite population and the average citizen.
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Introduction
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If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to
favor freedom, and yet deprecate agitation, are men who want crops
without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and
lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many
waters. This struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one;
or it may be both moral and physical; but it must be a struggle. Power
concedes nothing without a demand. It never did, and it never will.
Frederick Douglass, Canandaigua NY, 3 August 1857
This quote by Frederick Douglass represents the intense struggle to get rid of
oppressive leaders that deprive their citizens of freedom. It is not easy to get rid of a
powerful leader as we saw in the recent protests in Egypt to force Muhammad Hosni
Sayyid Mubarak out of office, but nonetheless it is essential to engage in this moral or
physical struggle in order to reach a democracy. Abraham Lincoln gave another great
quote in the 1800s about democracy: “The ballot is stronger than the bullet.” When
populations rise up against their government, many times they have to resort to
physical violence. However, their end goal is to ensure their voices are heard on an
every day basis in a peaceful way, through democratic elections. Lincoln’s idea that
the ballot is stronger than the bullet is constantly being supported by current
situations like Egypt and Tunisia.
Unfortunately, the process of becoming a democracy is not as simple as it may
seem. Is democratization a unilateral process or chaotic? Does there have to be a
distinct beginning and end to a democratic transition? Can every country become a
democracy if they are determined enough or are there preconditions? Does a country
need to be a state, reach a certain level of economic development, or have a unified
culture before democracy is possible? Does there have to be consensus and
agreement between elites? How do the elites transform into a consensual elite group?
Are elites the only people that matter in national decision-making or do the masses
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have a prominent role? Is it only important to have social movements before the
transition begins to promote change, or do they need to continue throughout the
transition? This thesis will work towards answering these questions by examining
theories and applying them to three relevant and modern case studies.
For several decades, academics have been studying the process of countries
becoming democracies from either authoritarian rule or dictatorships. The interest in
this subject grew when there were waves of democratization in Central America and
post-communist Europe in the 1900s. One of the main questions that was proposed
was how are these countries becoming democracies? Many academics came up with
their own theories to this question and answers ranged from the involvement of elite
negotiations to a certain level of economic development. The academic world has
had theories about democracy for such a long time, and I will test a few of them in
modern examples to see if they still apply today.
My thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter deals with theories
about the process of becoming a democracy. I first discuss preconditionalists versus
universalists and then move on to the debate about elites versus the masses. Some
believe that elites are the only drivers in national outcomes and that the elites must
come to a consensus or agreement before a democracy can successfully emerge.
Others argue that social movements are an important factor in the successes of
democratic transitions. For the next three chapters on the case studies, I focus on the
elites versus masses debate.
I chose South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti as my case studies because they all tell
a different story about democratization. My second chapter is on South Africa and it
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discusses the history of the country from its colonization in 1652 to the mid-1990s
when it transitioned to a democracy. South Africa had a relatively straightforward
democratic transition with a definitive start and end point of the transition and an
obvious elite negotiation period, but other factors such as intense ethnic divides make
it an interesting country to study.
The third chapter is on Serbia, a post-communist country with deep political
divisions. Serbians take politics very seriously making it difficult for all the elites to
come to an agreement. Serbia had a very different path than South Africa to
democracy and did not have a distinct beginning and end point of its transition
because of its membership in Yugoslavia until 2006. I focused on the difficulty the
masses faced to oust their dictator from power and the short-termed alliances between
elites. However, since Serbia also had a successful transition, this similar ending
makes it an interesting case to study.
Haiti is studied in my fourth chapter and two democratic transitions are
examined from the past twenty years of Haiti’s history. Haiti’s first transition after
ousting Duvalier was successful but failed in the consolidation phase during
Aristide’s rule. The second transition from 2004-2006, once Aristide was forced out
of power, is also studied to compare the two transitions and how Haiti progressed as a
nation to be a more successful candidate for democracy in the long term.
All three countries had a successful transition to a democratic government but
their distinct histories and situations made them interesting and relevant to study. The
goal of my thesis is to see if there is a common theory that explains why these three
countries with such different pasts and transitions were all able to transition to a
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democracy. I hypothesize that the democratic process is a lot more chaotic than
theories will make you believe and therefore there is not one single theory that can be
applied to all the case studies used. In addition, I believe that the contemporary
theory concerning the importance of social movements in transitions, in addition to
elite negotiations, will be supported.

5

Chapter 1
The Theory of Democratization
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The process of democratization, or the transition from authoritarian regimes to
democratic regimes, has been studied since the 1970’s and has resulted in many
theories. Some believe that there are preconditions to a successful transition and
countries cannot become a democracy without first achieving a certain level of
stateness, economic development, or cultural cohesion, while others believe that any
country can become a democracy without meeting preconditions. Another debate
discusses elites versus the masses as the prime drivers of democratic transitions. The
most prominent theoretical disagreements will be examined in this chapter, but first
let me define key terms that will be used throughout this paper.
Democratization is the transition from an authoritarian, totalitarian, or other
nondemocratic regime to a democracy. Democracy has been, and is still presently, a
difficult term to define and to categorize countries as such. According to Francisco
Gonzalez and Desmond King, an ideal democracy has free and fair participation and
contestation and a wide protection of civil rights provided by the jurisdiction,
presence, and authority of the state. 1 The level of democracy a state possesses varies
and is measured by research institutions like Freedom House based on characteristics
including fair electoral processes, political participation, freedom of expression,
personal autonomy, the functioning of government, and rule of law. 2 A democracy
involves more than liberalization; it requires governance by the people. More
specifically, it demands open contestation over the right to win control of the
government, which in turn requires free competitive elections. A transition can be
defined as the time between the breakdown of the dictatorship and the conclusion of
1

Francisco E. Gonzalez and Desmond King, “The State and Democratization: The United States in
Comparative Perspective” (B.J. Pol.S 34, 2004), 193, 195, 201.
2
Freedom House. Received 4 May 2010. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1
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the first democratic national elections. The consolidation of a democracy occurs after
the transition to a democracy; it is the process of adaptation of democratic structures
and norms, which come to be accepted and valued in themselves. 3

Preconditionalists vs. Universalists
Preconditionalists
The debate between preconditionalists and universalists is one of the most
well known and discussed in transitology.

Many political theorists believe that a

democracy generally emerges from a particular set of conditions and experiences and
that it is difficult to have a successful democratic transition without such
preconditions. Universalists on the other hand believe that any country can become a
democracy as long as they are persistent. This debate is a question of whether
democratization is an outcome of actions or conditions, or perhaps both. The
following are a few examples of preconditions that a country must acquire before a
transition is possible: stateness, cultural unity, and socioeconomic development. This
view was dominant in the 1950’s and 1960’s.

Stateness
State building is the process of building up institutions of coercion and
coordination, such as the function of bureaucracies, the identification of citizenship,
and the building up of legitimacy. “When there are profound differences about the

3

John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and
Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan,
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and PostCommunist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
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territorial boundaries of the political community’s state and profound differences as
to who has the right of citizenship in that state”, a stateness problem arises. 4
According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, a democracy is impossible until the
stateness problem is resolved. In other words, a sovereign state is a prerequisite to
democracy.
For most of history, stateness was not considered an issue for democratization.
In Latin America and Southern Europe all countries that attempted democratization
were uncontested states. However, post-communist Eastern Europe, including
Romania, Serbia, and the Baltic states, presented a different situation. The redrawing
of borders, brutal expulsion and marches, Nazi and Soviet expansion, and the demise
of Austro-Hungarian and Soviet empires exemplify problems of stateness. Many
people could have been citizens or subjects of three or more states during their
lifetime without ever moving from their birthplace.
Linz and Stepan argue that citizenship and boundaries are the key issues that
must be solved to become a state and then a democracy. In a democracy, it is
necessary to be able to define the demos, or the people who are being represented by
the democracy. Therefore it is crucial that a state is present to certify citizenship,
since without citizenship a democracy is impossible. In Southern Europe and Latin
America, there was no question of citizenship because the state was perceived as
legitimate and nationality laws had defined citizenship before nondemocratic rule
arose and was maintained under authoritarian rule. 5

4
5

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 16
Ibid. 28.
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In Eastern Europe it was, and still remains, difficult to become a state because
each nation is multinational, multilingual, and multicultural. It must be agreed upon
who will be considered a citizen and who will not, which is very difficult when there
are so many different cultures and view points involved. Generosity moments,
according to Robert Hislope, could be one way to aid in the unification of a nationstate. A generosity moment is when dominant ethnic groups in multiethnic societies
decide to accommodate minorities. It is hypothesized that “a generous, liberal
approach towards minorities is the best way to ensure a peaceful transition, earn the
democratic consent of minorities, and secure the legitimacy of the state.” 6 Even
though this situation is not successful in all cases and is greatly impacted by structural
factors and leadership variables, generosity moments are one way in which to include
minority groups within the nation-state. 7
Furthermore, Linz and Stepan argue that a nation must have a determinate
domain to become a state. Robert A. Dahl is quoted in the book by Linz and Stepan,
“The more indeterminate the domain and scope, the more likely that the unit would, if
established, become embroiled in jurisdictional squabbles or even civil wars.” 8 Once
a border is established, a country can define which people inhabit the area and can
work towards nation building, or how a country perceives itself, in addition to state
building. And only then can the nation move towards democracy building.
Another concern that must be addressed is the legitimacy of state institutions.
Political institutions, such as the judiciary and police, must be respected and deemed
6

Robert Hislope, “The Generosity Moment: Ethnic Politics, Democratic Consolidation and the State in
Yugoslavia (Croatia), South Africa and Czechoslovakia” (Democratization, Vol. 5 No. 1, Spring
1998), 64.
7
Ibid. 84.
8
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 29
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as legitimate and effective in order for a country to be able to transition to a
democracy. The people need to be confident in their leaders and their government
and feel secure in their country before a democracy could be successful.

Culture
While some believe that politics is the driver in transitology, others believe
that culture must be included in the analysis. It is important not to treat culture as the
sole causal factor, however, but focus on “how cultural factors intersect with political,
social, and economic forces to produce specific outcomes in specific places and time
periods.” 9 Culture concerns values of tolerance, deference and belief and how these
beliefs bind people together in a meaningful way. However, since it is subjective, it is
always changing, especially since culture must be learned. 10 Culture has enormous
power to shape individual perceptions and behavior but also has the power to unify
and mobilize entire societies. 11
Recent strains of theory divulge beliefs that the collectively shared ideas,
beliefs, values and identities societies embrace and by which they define themselves
must be widespread in a nation-state before regime transitions can occur and be
successful. It is important to construct a strong and cohesive national identity among
the population, especially in a multi-ethnic area. Therefore, a common culture and
nation building is necessary and could be argued that it goes hand-in-hand with state
building for a future stable democracy.

9

Timothy C. Lim, Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues (London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006), 195
10
Ibid. 87.
11
Ibid. 88.
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However, one criticism involves the difference between political culture and
general culture. Does a country need to have a consensus on what the acceptable
culture is statewide, or must only the political culture be considered, such as tolerance
and deference to authority? It can be argued that unless political culture is specified,
the cultural argument would not be justified because many countries, such as the
United States, is a mixing-pot of cultures but everyone agrees upon the general rules
of politics and political culture. Lim argues that culture cannot be considered on its
own but merely helps determine the choices of political leaders. 12
Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl question whether or not Eastern
European countries and democratization should be comparable to Southern European
and Latin American democratization because of their drastically different
backgrounds, stateness, and culture. 13 The four differences that Schmitter and Karl
discuss are the points of departure in socio-occupational structure, the extent of
collapse of the old regime, the role of external actors, and the sequence of
transformative processes. Post-research, Schmitter and Karl believe that Eastern
European “regime change can be – at least initially – treated as conceptually and
theoretically equivalent to those that preceded them. Furthermore, it can be expected
that they face the same range of possible outcomes…” 14 Even though they have the
same possible outcomes, it is argued that because of their extremely rapid, nonviolent, and definitive transitions their consolidations will be lengthy, conflict-driven,

12

Ibid. 194.
Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and
Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?” (Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No.1,
Spring, 1994), 173-185.
14
Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and
Consolidologists,” 184-185.
13
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and inconclusive. The Eastern European countries will have a more difficult time
than Southern Europe and Latin America in deciding on the appropriate type of
democracy and will most likely end up as an unconsolidated democracy. In
conclusion, Schmitter and Karl believe that despite the differences in stateness,
culture, and other factors, Eastern European democratization can still be compared to
other transitions.

Economic Level
Another precondition that Przeworski, Limongi, and Lipset argue is important
in the democratization process is the economic level of the country in question. Some
theorists argue that the economy must reach a certain GDP before it is eligible to be a
democracy and others believe that the country’s money must be equally distributed
through capitalism to be a democratic contender. Timothy Lim argues, “The
transition to democracy happens because modernization creates new economic,
social, technological, and political conditions that ‘primitive’ or pre-modern political
systems (for example, dictatorships) are simply unable to handle over the long run.” 15
Przeworski and Limongi argue that there is a specific GDP marker that a
country must pass to ensure a successful democratic transition. Even though a
democracy can be initiated at any level of development, the richer the country the
greater its chances for survival. Also, if a country succeeds in generating
development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nations. 16 Through
extensive research they have pinpointed the threshold of democracy at $4,115 per
15

Timothy C. Lim, Doing Comparative Politics, 164.
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics 49.2
(1997): 177.
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capita income. Up until this GDP marker, the regime in place is unstable and will
react well to a democratic transition. After $6,000 democratic transitions are less
likely. Furthermore, if a country transitions to a democracy and has a per capita
income greater that $6,055, it’s democracy will not fail during consolidation and the
higher the per capita income the more likely it will succeed as a stable democracy. 17
Friedman agrees with Przeworski and Limongi that more developed countries are
more stable and more likely to get a long. Freidman’s “Golden Arches Theory”
argues that any country with a McDonalds, and therefore developed enough to
support a McDonalds, will not war against other countries with McDonalds.
The reason that a more economically developed country is a better candidate
for democracy is based on the development of a middle class. A middle class is
considered stable, as opposed to having only elites and a working class, and will
therefore stabilize the system and make a democracy possible. Furthermore, income
can be considered a proxy for education; more educated people are more likely to
embrace democratic values and understand the importance of political participation. 18
Even though it is uncertain what type of role the economy plays in democratization, it
appears to have a large impact on deciding whether or not a democracy will succeed.

Universalists
As discussed earlier, Timothy Lim states that it is analytically foolish and
naïve to believe that a democracy is possible anywhere, anytime, as long as people

17
18

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts”, 165.
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts”, 166
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want it. 19 Underlying structural conditions and processes are unavoidable and vitally
important to understand before experimenting with democracy transitions. However,
despite Lim’s strong opinions, many theorists do believe that preconditions to
democracy do not exist. In opposition, some transitologists believe that a democracy
can emerge in all sorts of ways and settings without preconditions. For example,
universalists believe that a country does not need to have a certain level of economic
development to succeed at a transition to democracy.
According to Giuseppe Di Palma, any nation state can become a democracy
through diffusion and implementation. In other words, many diverse democratic
countries have tested political institutions, practices, rules, and procedures and then
borrow them from each other to govern themselves. Political actors in transition to
democracy go to this pool of previously tested political procedures to select and
improve upon before adopting for themselves. Therefore, as long as democracy
appears as the most attractive future regime, the people of a prospective country can
become worthy of democratization by simply wanting it. To make democratic
regimes attractive, crafting must occur by changing the word choice used to describe
democracy to get people interested and engaged. For example, instead of saying that
democracy’s weakness is that no one wins; one must convince their country that
democracy’s strength is in fact that no single group will determine outcomes so
everyone will have a voice. 20 In conclusion, democratic transitions can occur
anywhere with no preconditions for the economy or society as long as the people
view the idea of democracy positively and are willing to try it.
19

Timothy C. Lim, Doing Comparative Politics, 170
Giuseppe Di Palma. To Craft Democracies: an Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1990).
20
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Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (1986)
agree with Di Palma that politics, or the will to get things done and the autonomy of
humans, can lead a state to a successful democracy. According to O’Donnell,
Schmitter, and Whitehead, the transition from an authoritarian regime is not linear
and is extremely uncertain. The outcome, the number of payers, the rules, and
everything else involved gets created as the “game” continues on. They use the
metaphor of a multi level chess board to describe the “game” of democratic
transitions where each move has unknown consequences and could potentially lead to
a win. Only after a transition ends will people begin to trust each other and work
together in a political democracy. 21
The wave of global democratization during the 1970’s was used to support
universalism because dozens of countries became democracies without acquiring
presumable preconditions. Even though many countries deserted their authoritarian
regimes during this time, by the end of the interwar period all Eastern European
countries failed to consolidate their democratic regime except for Czechoslovakia.
This wide failure of democratic transitions questions the success of universalist
thought. One possible explanation for this failure is that there is value behind certain
preconditions and that the Eastern European countries were not able to achieve
stateness, cultural consistency, or appropriate economic levels before attempting to
democratize.

21

Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986).
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Criticism
Sheri Berman argues in her article “How Democracies Emerge” that both
preconditionalists and universalists are misguided. Both theories surmise that
democratic transitions are smooth, either after achieving the necessary preconditions
or by merely setting their mind to it. However, Berman studied the histories of
modern well-functioning and stable democracies, such as England, the United States,
and Scandinavia, and discovered that most democratization stories have struggle,
conflict, and violence. “Democracy developed in various ways and in various local
contexts across Western Europe. But it never came easily, peacefully, or in some
straightforward, stage-like progression.” 22 All types of countries can become
democracies but even the best-positioned ones struggled in the process.
By studying modern and successful democracies of Western Europe one can
see that they did not have a smooth transition to democracy. The French Revolution
of 1789 brought an end to one authoritarian regime, but within ten years Napoleon
Bonaparte became the military dictator by coup. Within this decade, attitudes
changed even though a democracy did not last. When Louis XVIII took over he
increased suffrage and equality before the law and created a constitution with a 2chamber parliament, but the society was still extremely divided. After the 1830 civil
war Louis-Philippe Orleans came to power and created a liberal authoritarian regime.
The Revolutions of 1848 resulted in presidential elections where Louis-Napoleon
Bonaparte won in 1848 but his term resulted in a populist-authoritarian system when
he attempted to have his term of office and powers extended. With the first World

22

Sheri Berman, “How Democracies Emerge: Lessons from Europe” (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18,
No. 1, Jan 2007), 37.
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War approaching, there was already rising political discontent and political
mobilization, and deepening social division; changes had occurred but no full
democratic transitions.
World War I started a democratic wave across Germany, Austria, Sweden,
Poland, Finland, Hungary, and more European countries, but war also brought
challenges to the new democratic regimes such as economic devastation, inflation,
reparations, political divisions, and national humiliation. Most new democracies,
including France, Italy, Germany, Spain and Austria, were weak or failed later. 23 By
the mid-1940’s Britain was the only country against the Nazi’s in Europe and
democratization failed in Europe. Post-WWII brought upon the perfect conditions for
democracy such as the authoritarian regimes were crushed and discredited, the United
States as the worlds strongest democracy made clear commitment to political and
economic reconstruction, European publics recognized democracy as its best option,
and past liberal and democratic components were reclaimed and built up. However,
democracy was unsuccessful in most post-Communist countries. Many people would
argue that if a country is unable to sustain and consolidate their democracy during
their initial attempts, democracy will never be successful in their country. Berman
takes a different point of view.
Berman argues that just because a country today is not following a gradual,
liberal path to democracy does not mean that it will not succeed in the future.
“Problems and failures can be seen as integral parts” of the transition process and can
even be argued to make it a stronger democracy when it begins consolidation because

23

Ibid. 37.
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the population has already changed their attitudes. 24 Even successful democracies
today, including France and England, had turbulent histories. Berman argues that it
makes sense that young democracies today are weak, ineffectual, illiberal, or violent
because it is a long painstaking process that is not linear. It took France 150 years to
become a democracy so it is important that we do not discourage countries that do not
follow a gradual, liberal path to democracy. In conclusion to Sheri Berman’s
argument, both universalists and proconditionalists are wrong because they fail to
look at the full history of today’s strong democracies. If these theories looked into
the histories, they would find that all new democracies are weak and illiberal and will
most likely fail in the short run, but over the long run ideas and values change and
democracies are more likely.
Sheri Berman brings a very important issue to the table that most, if not all,
democratic transitions are not smooth and linear. Countries that have violence and
may not succeed the first time can still be successful in the future. However, many
scholars may argue that universalists and preconditionalists do not say that it will
either be an easy straightforward process or will be unsuccessful. Research shows
that preconditionalists believe that it is impossible to democratize without obtaining
certain preconditions before hand, not that if they have these conditions that the
process will be linear and smooth to a successful democracy. The universalists have
the same certitude when they say that any country can become a democracy it they
are crafty, autonomous, and determined, it just might not be smooth. Guillermo

24

Ibid. 38.
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O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead blatantly state in their article
that the process of democratization is not smooth or predictable. 25

Elites vs. Masses
Another way of organizing the various theories surrounding democratization
is elitism versus the power of the masses. Some transitologists believe that political
elites have the most impact on democratization while others believe that pressures
from below, or public mass involvement, are the key factor to a successful democratic
transition.
Elites
The idea that elites are the only drivers in national outcomes has been the
dominant point of view for the majority of the transitology theory life span. The elite
theory has been studied by many political scientists including Vilfredo Pareto and
Robert Michels who argue that the organized minority have the power and
accessibility to societal resources to impact political outcomes. Michels’ Iron Law of
Oligarchy goes even further to say that even democratic states will eventually and
inevitably develop into oligarchies.
John Higley and Michael Burton are two transitologists who believe that
democracies succeed only when the political elites work together and compromise
and that the masses do not have any influence on transitions. They argue that the
reason that countries with extremely similar population sizes, economic development
levels, class structures, ethnic complexions, and religious and cultural patterns have
25

Guillermo O’Donnell, et al. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 1986.
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major differences in their politics is because they have different types of political
elites.
The political elite consists of thousands of people who hold top positions in
powerful organizations and movements who participate in or directly influence
national political decision-making. This includes top business, government, military,
party, union, media, and religious leaders, among others. 26 Another way to define
political elite is the group of people who affect national political outcomes regularly
and substantially. There are four types of political elites, according to Higley and
Burton, and each type of elite corresponds to a type of regime. Elite integration, how
elites structure and characterize their internal relations with each other across faction
barriers, and elite differentiation, the process through which elite groups become
more numerous, diverse, and functionally specialized, are used to classify these elite
groups. 27
The first type of elite is a divided, disunified elite. There is violence and
distrust across factions resulting in low interpersonal relations or cooperation.
Members don’t agree to appropriate political conduct, also called the ‘rules of the
game’. Furthermore, many elite fear that they will lose everything if the other party
wins and, therefore, resort to extreme measures to protect themselves and their
interests, including methods of killing and imprisonment. Since there are strong
barriers between factions and few elite groups to represent the people, weak
integration and narrow differentiation lead the regime to be unstable and
unrepresentative. Coups or revolutions happen frequently and democratic processes
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tend to break down over time. Regime instability can be described as “when
government executive power is subject to irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or
widely expected seizures by force.” 28 Peter McDonough provides one example of a
disunified elite: Brazil between 1972-1973 when the factions included militarygovernmental, economic, the church, and urban labor. 29 Bernard Brown and William
Schonfeld provide other examples in their own studies of France. France in the
1960’s and 1970’s is another example. In the mid 1960’s elites didn’t agree on basic
political institutions and in the 1970’s there were no ties between elites across
factional lines. 30 Disunity is actually the generic condition of national elites and is
considered by Higley and Burton as “the modal pattern of western politics.” 31
The second type of elite is an ideologic elite. This is when all elite factions
publicly support the same policies and ideology and most elites are members of the
same party or movement. The elites are connected to other elites through this
dominant party and there are no regular seizures of government. The elites have
many relations between each other and across faction barriers resulting in a strong
elite integration, but narrow differentiation because of the single party domination.
The ideologic elite results in a stable but unrepresentative regime, for example the
communist USSR, communist China, and Nazi Germany.
A fragmented elite is labeled the third type. In a situation where there is weak
integration but wide differentiation, the elites have split up into so many different
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groups but they refuse to cooperate with each other. This results in an extremely
confusing political arena because there are so many different groups trying to be
heard and have an impact on political outcomes but refuse to work together. The
regime at stake is labeled as unstable and representative. The past three types of
elites and regimes, if considered democratic, must be labeled as illiberal democracies
or pseudo-democracies.
The fourth type of elite is called a consensual elite. Elites make an effort to
agree on the roles of the political game while still holding different ideas and values.
They do not push their disagreements to violence once they agree to abide by
common codes of political conduct and there is an extensive web of interpersonal
relationships over all factions. This results in a stable, representative democracy.
Democracies can be composed of many different things, but what is indispensable is a
consensually unified elite. A consensual unified elite is a precondition for, but not a
guarantee of, a stable democracy. 32 A consensual elite can originate from being a
former colony or being territorially dependent on an existing consensual elite state.
For example, the elites in the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, and Tunisia became
consensually unified once the British rule left. However, presently colonialism is not
as common and therefore consensual elites do not originate but must be created
through transformations from other elite types.
As described earlier, countries with similar characteristics frequently have
different politics because of their elites’ behaviors and classification. In addition,
even though economic development, class structures, and other social issues may
32
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change, the established elite type and their practices persist until a profound crisis or
event triggers an elite transformation. In other words, until an event occurs that
forces political elites to reevaluate their behaviors towards each other, the elite type,
and therefore regime, remains the same. For a democratic transition to be successful,
elites need to transform into consensual elites through one of two processes: elite
settlement or general elite convergence.
Elite settlements are relatively rare events that occur when warring national
elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating
compromises on their most basic disagreements. This results in the creation of
patterns of open but peaceful competition, based on the norm of restrained
partisanship among all major elite groups. The elites work to transform an unstable
political regime of frequent seizures of government power to stable regimes that open
up the possibilities for a democracy. Elite settlements occur in two types of
situations. First, when there is a costly and inconclusive conflict where no group is
the clear winner. Since everyone has lost, elites are willing to compromise. The
English civil war in 1688 between the Tories and Whigs and the Columbian civil war
in 1957 between the conservatives and liberals are two such examples. The other
situation that paves the way for an elite settlement is a major crisis. This usually
involves the head of state, policy failures, power abuses, or personal weaknesses that
make the elite discontent. One example is Venezuela in 1958 when there was a sharp
economic downturn and the military dictator Perez Jimenez tries to extend his tenure.
In order for elite settlements to be successful they must be carried out quickly, usually
within one year of its emergence. Even though elite settlements are rare, within the
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context of what other processes are available to create a consensual elite, an elite
settlement is the most likely process.
Elite convergence is another possible process to create consensual elites. Elite
convergence is also referred to as a 2-step elite transformation. In the first step, some
warring factions collaborate in electoral politics to mobilize a reliable electoral
majority. They begin to win elections repeatedly and therefore protect their interests.
In step two, the elite factions that oppose the coalition of step one tire of losing
elections. They realize that they cannot gain government power any other way, such
as force, so they accept democratic rules of the winning coalition to have a chance to
represent their own ideologies in the political realm. This results in a consensually
unified elite as well but does not happen as quickly as an elite settlement.
Higley and Burton argue that elite settlements are a crucial development in
democratizations. For example, without the settlement in 1688-1689 another civil
war would have erupted in England. The settlement also secured the upper-class
control of the regime, avoided future civil wars, revolutions, and coups, led England’s
rise to world domination, and led to a peaceful evolution to democracy. Higley and
Burton assert that it does not matter if peasants are strong or weak; the key variable
for political stability and eventual peaceful democratization is the unification of
previously disunified elites. Democratic transitions cannot be predicted or explained
in terms of social, economic, and cultural forces because elite settlements are the
result of relatively autonomous elite choices. 33
Elites also have a strong impact on the success of the consolidation of
democracies and their potential breakdowns. If the elites are disunified, it is more
33
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likely that the democracy is only temporary and will revert back to authoritarianism. 34
However, if the elite are consensually unified than the consolidation of a democracy
is more likely. Since elites have influence on national outcomes regularly and
substantially, they are the only ones that can make effective change on issues such as
unemployment in post-industrial states. 35
Higley and Burton argue that mass movements and the public do not have a
significant impact on regime transitions without the help from elites. Unless mass
movements are directed by acknowledged leaders and organized they will dissipate or
be suppressed. Any movement must have elites to be successful. Even if an
unorganized popular force somehow succeeds in toppling a regime, they most likely
will not establish a stable regime. Democratic stability depends on agreements that
can be struck only among elites representing rival organizations and popular
groupings. 36
According to Higley and Burton, not only do mass movements not have a
strong force in democratization, but also neither does other preconditions. Many
preconditionalists believe that democratization is only achievable when a nation state
has reached levels or statuses in economy, culture, or other aspects of the state.
However, Higley, Burton, and Gunther argue, “stable democracies do not emerge
simply by writing constitutions, holding elections, expanding human rights,
accelerating economic growth, or exterminating leftist insurgencies. The vital step is
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the consensual unification of previously disunified elites.” 37 Elite transformations
usually occur from internal situations and contingencies, therefore Western countries
can do little to promote stable democracies where they do not now exist. In many
cases, like Iraq, it can be argued that the US weakens prospects of democracy by
exacerbating elite disunity. First you need to get a democracy, and then work on
economic equality, human rights, and other aspects of a well-functioning democracy
to succeed in consolidation.
Masses
On the other side of spectrum, Sidney Tarrow wrote a book entitled Power in
Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics in 1998, which discusses the
important role of social movements in contentious situations. He argues that
contentious politics is triggered when political opportunities change and constraints
create incentives for social actors who lack resources on their own. When these
actors are supported by dense social networks and motivated by action-oriented
symbols, contentious politics leads to social movements. 38 Social movements, as
defined by Tarrow, are “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social
solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” 39
The social movement theory, the belief that social movements and mass
mobilization have a great impact on political decisions and democratization, has
many imbedded concepts. One concept is resource mobilization, which is based on
the assumption that social movements can be explained largely in terms of individual
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action and decisions, resulting in most of the basic dynamics of social movements to
be similar. Tarrow argues that this focused too much on internal aspects of the
movements and didn’t touch upon cycles of mobilization. The new social movement
theory focuses on opposite issues of that of resource mobilization theory, such as
global trends. However, its weakness is that it focuses too much on the broad, global
issues and ignores the variations in the character of movements.
The political opportunity structure, presented by Tocqueville, is the most
recent concept and arguably the most effective. The political context and structure is
valued in this concept and it states that revolts occur, not when people are most
oppressed or best represented, but when a closed system of opportunities has begun to
open up. 40 Examples of a political opportunity include when major conflicts within
political elite offices that challengers can take advantage of or when levels of access
to institutional participants have begun to open up. 41 A new wave of mobilization will
occur when costs and risks of collective action decrease and potential gains increase.
“Mass outbreaks of collective action are best understood as the collective responses
of citizens, groups and elites to an expanding structure of political opportunities.” 42
Contentious politics has always been present where there is human society.
However, in such early human societies, such actions “usually expressed the claims
of ordinary people directly, locally, and narrowly,” responding to immediate
grievances without being organized. 43 This usually resulted in brief spurts of hostility
intermittent with periods of passivity. Sometime during the 18th century, a new and
40
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more general repertoire of collective action developed in Western Europe and North
America. 44 Hand in hand with state-building, social movements gained strength and
became broad, national movements. This can be explained by the growth of print and
association as the state became more secure and powerful; movements learned to use
pamphlets, other forms of print, and association to their benefit. The state became the
target of national movements as well because it was a unified, single entity that had
power to make war, provision cities, and raise taxes. Contentious politics has a
strong relationship with the necessary development of citizenship, therefore
“[contentious politics] can never be fully suppressed without endangering democracy
itself. What this means is that contentious politics forms around the armature of
institutional politics, and rises and falls with the rhythm of changes in political
opportunities and constraints…” 45
One difficulty of studying social movements is that it is not easy to identify
particular movement actions as the cause of a specific outcome. In other words, it is
difficult to know whether or not a social movement had the outcome it intended. 46
However, it can be argued that the mere presence of social movements is important
for democratization to be successful. Whether or not the leaders take into
consideration the specific concerns the people are representing, the people must feel
like they have a say in the outcome of their country and feel connected to each other
as a nation. Social movements also break down the legal, bureaucratic, and
ideological barriers. “Movement participation is not only politicizing; it is
empowering, both in the psychological sense of increasing willingness to take risks
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and in the political one of affording new skills and broadened perspectives.” 47 Once
social movements could spread quickly over time and space it became ways for
ordinary people to advance collective claims against powerful opponents. 48
Each culture has its own typical mode of movement depending on what will
work best to get their views across. For example, the English sign petitions and the
French protest in the streets. Individuals and groups will take advantage of the
political opportunities available to use the mode of mobilization that works most
effectively in their society and government. They work with elites and each other to
make change.
Sidney Tarrow and many other political theorists who believe in bottom-up
theories do not discount the impact that elites have on political outcomes. Instead,
they argue that elites are not the sole driver for political changes; mass mobilization,
when instituted at optimal times during times of expanded political opportunities, can
have a large impact on political outcomes as well. For example, the Civil Rights
Movement in the United States had a large impact on African American civil rights
and civil liberties. Social movements are critical for progressive social change and
can have a large impact through the use of mobilizing structures, framing ideology,
and solidarity.
Nancy Bermeo believes that mass mobilization is extremely important in the
process of democratization, even if it is characterized as extremism. Many
moderation theorists believe that “radical popular organizations threaten democratic
transitions if they don’t moderate their demands and behavior as the moment of elite
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choice approaches.” 49 In her article “Myths of Moderation”, Bermeo argues that even
though extremism can be a potential barrier to democratization in some scenarios,
extremism can also foster the discussion of democratization.
The moderation argument states that if there is too much popular mobilization
or pressure from below, the changes for a democracy can be spoiled. This argument
is supported by many prominent political theorists including Terry Karl, Myron
Weiner, Sam Huntington, and Daniel Levine, who all believe that a conservative,
elite-driven regime change is more likely to result in a successful democracy. In
other words, “if a transition is to be carried out successfully, the ‘threat from below’
must be somehow moderated.” 50 Samuel Valenzuela argues that the “ideal mix for
democratization is high labor mobilization at certain critical moments or the
breakdown of authoritarian institutions, followed by restraint when the political
agenda shifts in favor of redemocratization.” 51 Mass mobilization is effective and
essential, but is dangerous if it continues too long or with too much intensity. For
example, if violence occurs, a dictatorship is likely.
Bermeo’s study of Portugal, Spain, Peru, the Philippines, and South Korea,
disproves the moderation argument. In all of these countries there were radical
pressures from below, radical provisional governments, armed movements, violent
strikes, and riots, among other forms of extremist mass mobilization during their
transitions away from authoritarian regimes. In many of these countries there was
actually high worker mobilization when the first democratic elections were held and
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by looking at strike data it is apparent that a successful transition to democracy does
not require moderation on the part of the working class.
During transitions there are three scenarios that can occur in relation to elites
and extremist mass mobilization. First, if pivotal elites forecast extremist victory,
they will reject democracy because they see it as an intolerable threat. This happened
in China in 1989. The second scenario, which occurred in Peru in 1977 and Greece in
1975, is when elites forecast extremist defeat and moderate victory in the elections
they may accept democracy because it’s a way to escape public unrest. The third
scenario is if elites forecast extremist defeat and their own victory in elections, they
may accept democracy as a form of legitimacy for themselves. This happened in
Portugal in 1974 and Spain in 1976. In Peru, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, elites saw
democracy as a solution to the problem of extremism rather than a problem in itself.
After calculating risks, polls have been used to indicate that the current elites would
either win the election or that their moderate party would defeat the extremists.
“Moderation is not a prerequisite for the construction of democracy; the parameters of
tolerable mobilization are broader than we originally anticipated.” 52 Democracy can
be created despite extremist demands and high mobilization; high mobilization can in
fact aid in the emergence of democratization.

Case Studies
Timothy Lim’s book, Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to
Approaches and Issues, explains the various methods for picking case studies for a
comparative analysis. The Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD, MSD) is based on
52
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finding two or more very similar systems or countries to compare political, social,
demographic, economic, and cultural aspects. According to Lim, “…the important
point is that the characteristics the systems share in principle can be held constant and
can therefore be considered irrelevant in explaining a particular social or political
phenomenon (the dependent variable) that occurs in one, but not both cases.” 53 The
goal of the comparative analysis would be to find the significant dissimilarity
between the two systems, which would be labeled as the independent variable.
In the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD, MDS), the researcher finds
two systems that are different in almost every respect, except for the variable under
investigation. One difficulty researchers face when using MDSD is that it cannot
adequately deal with multiple causations. In other words, there is no way to presume
that a certain phenomenon is necessarily the product of one and only one cause.
Different causes may produce the same or similar results, and different combinations
of cases may produce the same result.
For both MSD and MDS, the researcher then distinguishes if the case studies
have similar or different outcomes. Therefore, there are four variations of
characterizations, MSD with similar outcomes (MSD-SO), MSD with different
outcomes (MSD-DO), MDS-SO, MDS-DO.
I followed the Most Different Systems Design with Similar Outcomes, MDDSO, in the selection of my case studies. I wanted to have three countries that had
extremely different backgrounds and transition characteristics but similar outcomes
for democratic transitions, in this case all successes. My goal is to find what was
similar between the countries that made them have similar outcomes despite their
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varied histories and transition processes. In order to accomplish this, I need to follow
the MDD to find the significant similarity between the systems, which would be
labeled the independent variable. The countries I have chosen are South Africa,
Serbia, and Haiti, countries that have all accomplished a democratic transition despite
differing situations.
For most of transitology history, elites have been viewed as the prominent
actor in democratization following Higley, Burton, and Gunther’s theory. However,
the role of the masses has been focused on more and more as time passes. The
purpose of my thesis is to examine the histories and democratization processes in
each of the three countries to determine the influence mass mobilization and elites
have in democratic transitions. If social movements and other forms of mass
mobilization do not have a prominent role in the transition, are there other theories
that could be used to explain the countries outcomes? Therefore, mass mobilization
will be my independent variable, the variable that I am studying to see its impact, or
lack of, on democratization processes in various countries.
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Chapter 2
Democratization in South Africa
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Introduction
South Africa’s history is tumultuous from the time it was colonized by the
Dutch East India Company in 1652 until the mid-1990s when it became a democratic
state. South Africa’s democratic transition can be argued to begin at many different
times or historic events, but for the purposes of this paper the transition began at the
change in presidential power in 1989. As Peter Willem Botha’s successor, F.W. de
Klerk became president in 1989 and was determined to end South Africa’s violence
through negotiations. The democratization process ended at South Africa’s first free
election on April 29, 1994 when Nelson Mandela was elected president.
During these five years, and before, social movements and elite negotiations
had a major impact on moving the country forward, leaving political discrimination
behind. However, one question that will be explored is how much impact did each of
these factors have on the democratization process and was one more effective than
the other? Also, how can this case study be characterized or defined by the theories
described in the previous chapter? Did it become a democracy through elite
settlements, the two-step process of democratization, or the role of mass
mobilization? By looking at the history of South Africa, from its colonization to the
first free election in 1994, the role of social movements and elites will be discussed.
South Africa is a strong example for this thesis because it follows the Most
Different Systems Design with Similar Outcomes. The qualification for Most
Different Systems in this analysis is that each case study has a different history,
culture, economy and society than the others. Also, it adheres to the similar outcomes
aspect of the model because South Africa, along with the other countries, was
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successful in its democratic transition. My goal is to divulge whether the presence of
social movements or elite negotiations had a greater impact on democratic success in
South Africa.
Demography
The demography of South Africa during the democratic transition is important
to discuss in order to understand the population’s actions for social movements and
negotiations. The distribution of ethnic groups is important for this case study
because of the multi-ethnic characteristic of South Africa and the societal challenges
it creates. Another significant demographic characteristic is the unemployment rate
because it tends to correspond with individuals’ feelings of despair and likelihood of
acting out.
In 1994, throughout all of South Africa, there were 30.7 million blacks
divided into eight tribes. The whites constituted five million and were divided into
either Afrikaners or English. The colored people made up 3.3 million and the Indian
population was 1 million. There were smaller populations as well including Chinese
that are not counted in these numbers. When divided into provinces after the reorganization of the state in the early 1990’s, the demographics were as followed 54 :

Northern Cape
Western Cape
Eastern Cape
North West
Orange Free State
KwaZulu-Natal
Pretoria/Witwatersr
54

Area (sq.
mi)
140,286
49,943
65,858
45,822
49,963
35,312
7,241

Population
(in millions)
.8
3.6
6.7
3.5
2.8
8.5
6.8

U.S. News & World Report, April 25, 1994.
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Literacy
Rate
67.6%
71.9%
67.7%
62%
62.1%
65.1%
69%

Unemploy
ment rate
16.7%
13.3%
23.6%
22.3%
15.3%
25.2%
16.6%

Income per
capita
$796
$1,163
$377
$497
$672
$531
$1,387

and/Vaal
Northern Transvaal
Eastern Transvaal

46,168
31,581

5.1
2.8

61.1%
59.1%

24.8%
16.3%

$201
$601

It is important to point out that in KwaZulu-Nata and Northern Transvaal, the
provinces with the highest unemployment rate, had 82.3% and 98% black population
respectively. 55 The unemployment rate was very high in South Africa and most of
those unemployed were blacks. This could be one reason blacks were willing to join
protests and trade unions.

History of South Africa 56
Colonization and Creation of Hostility (1652-1948)
The relationship between the Africans, Dutch (Afrikaans), British, and other
ethnicities started with the colonization of the southern tip of Africa by the Dutch
East India Company (VOC) in 1652. The Dutch forcefully took land and livestock
from many African groups, including the Khoisan and San, resulting in guerilla
warfare against the Dutch colonists. 57 The anger and resentment between the white
and black populations had begun.
Other foreigners began to come to Cape Town to work as immigrants or
slaves from Europe, India, and other countries during the 1600s and 1700s. Class
structure began to be noticeable and colonization expanded dispossessing the Khoisan
of more land and livestock forcing the natives into slavery. In 1795 the British
conquered the Cape starting a war in the early 1800s and securing the land for the
55
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British. By the end of the 1800s, gold and diamonds were found on the banks of the
Vaal River. Even though it helped the area’s economy, racial bifurcation of the
industrial labor force was established. White workers had higher positions than
blacks, which created a large entrenchment of the color bar in the labor force. When
the Chinese came over to work in the mines this social structure was enforced.
On May 31, 1910 the two colonies, the Cape and Natal, and the two republics,
Orange Free State and Transvaal, came together as a unified country, South Africa.
South Africa had high hopes for the future with Louis Botha as their prime minister
but soon became further divided by classes and race. In 1912, the South African
Native National Congress (later called African National Congress, ANC) was formed
to protect and enlarge the rights of the black population. Around the same time,
English middle-class citizens formed the National Party (NP). Later, the NP
conjoined with the Purified National Party, made up of Afrikaner nationalists, to form
the Reunited National Party in 1934. This new National Party believed in a white
South African nation that could only be created if there was parity between the Dutch
and English in terms of access to power and resources. The NP would later become
the governing party in South Africa for forty-four years and instill apartheid, a tragic
future that was not anticipated by the black population.
The political party in power, the South African Party, began to exclude blacks
from the body politic and created permanent subordination. The Black Land Act of
1913 was one of the first anti-African legislation establishing clear legal distinctions
between African Reserves and white farming areas. Africans were no longer allowed
to purchase land within white areas and vise versa, resulting in 87% of the country
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being considered white land. Sharecropping was also made illegal which redefined
blacks on white-owned land as servants degrading blacks into poverty. This led to a
national political movement led by communists and the Industrial and Commercial
Workers Union of Africa (ICU) to gain back land and status for laborers. This was
the first movement to unite large numbers in virtually all parts of the country to fight
local issues under a common national leadership, but the movement was never united
enough for substantial success. 58 Women also began to lead demonstrations
surrounding the ICU based on their discontent of the male dominated political
society.
In the 1919 election, the South African Party leader Jan Smuts became
president by defeating his opponents of the National Party, Labor Party, and the
Irredentist British of Natal. Smuts was the leader of the South African Party once
Botha passed away and he began introducing major segregationist measures.
As whites became more comfortable with their status they began testing their
power. In 1922 mine owners attempted to reduce their labor costs by replacing
whites with cheaper black workers. White job security decreased and white workers
fearing the social encroachment this might have on their lives, protested in the Rand
Rebellion. 59 The government crushed the rebellion through the declaration of martial
law; the mobilized army and militias killed 200 people, including innocent, black
bystanders. A compromise was reached that supported white workers but hurt the job
security of blacks.
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Residential segregation began in 1923 with the Natives Urban Areas Act that
forced Africans, Indians, and other ethnic minorities to the outskirts of cities so they
would not live in close proximity to whites. According to Colonel C.F. Stallard,
“South Africa’s towns were for the whites, and that blacks were only to be there in so
far as they were ‘ministering to the white man’s needs’.” 60 Even though the South
African Party lost in the election in 1924, the situation did not improve greatly. The
Nationalist and Labor Parties created a coalition government with J.B.M. Hertzog as
its prime minister. Their goal was to protect civilized labor, meaning those who had
conformed to European standards of living.
In 1934 two rival parties, the South African Party and Nationalist Party, united
and became the United South African National Party (United Party). A faction of
Afrikaner nationalists, led by D.F. Malan, refused to accept the merger and
maintained a remnant of the National Party called the Purified National Party. The
Purified National Party, or simply the National Party, believed in Afrikaner
nationalism and the segregation of blacks in society. The ANC Youth League was
created in 1944 by Anton Lembede, A.P. Mda, and Nelson Mandela to revitalize a
dying, pro-black institution and turn it into a mass party protest.
Trade unions began to grow and strengthen in the mid 1900s and showed their
discontent in the government. In August 1946 a mineworker’s strike brought 60-70
thousand mineworkers under the African Mine Workers Union demanding better food
and a wage increase. The strike was terminated by the state and the trade union
collapsed. Black trade unions were not recognized by the government until the 1970s
but they still worked diligently to demonstrate their concerns.
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The early history of South Africa is important in demonstrating how deep the
ethnic conflict is in South Africa dating back several hundred years. This section did
not cover all aspects of political and social unrest, but provided a summary to show
its origin. As time progresses, especially through the apartheid, this hostility
continues and grows steadily worse.

History of Apartheid (1948-1989)
The apartheid is remembered as a time period of roughly forty years that
attempted to reduce ethnic minorities, especially Africans, to the dregs of society
through legal segregation. However, this is also the time that the South African
population began moving forward toward democracy, demonstrated through vibrant
social movements.
The apartheid began in 1948 with the election of the National Party led by Dr.
Malan. The slogan of the National Party was “apartheid” which meant separateness.
This entailed the recognition and separation of specific groups of people and
emphasized the importance of the various nations and ethnicities of South Africa.
Some National Party followers wanted to completely separate blacks and whites
because they believed long term white power wouldn’t be able to survive with the
growing African population. Others just wanted to be assured the black labor would
be cheap and disciplined. This disagreement was minute and the universal belief of
white supremacy quickly surfaced through legislation.
The first discriminatory legislation was the Mixed Marriages Act in 1949
forbidding people to inter-marry between ethnicities. In 1950 several acts were
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passed including the Population Registration Act, the Immorality Act, the Group
Areas Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, and the Urban Labor Preference
Policy. These pieces of legislation worked to assign people to national categories, to
forbid intercourse between ethnicities, to ban communism, and to prohibit Africans
entering towns until all those already there had gotten jobs in the white labor market.
In 1952 the Native Laws Amendment Act granted certain Africans rights of
permanent residence in cities. Also, the Abolition of Passes and Documents Act
required all Africans to carry a ‘reference book’ or pass that noted their employment
history and residence rights.
The National Party won consecutive elections and in 1958 Hendrik Verwoerd
became president. Following his party’s ideology, he attempted to pervade all aspects
of South African life, including the media. Verwoerd wanted to deny South African
nationality for non-whites; by allowing African groups to develop their historic
homelands according to their own traditions, he stripped them of their citizenship.
These territories were controlled by chiefs who answered to the national government.
Rural uprisings ensued but were violently suppressed by the government.

Social Movements
In addition to these rural uprisings, there were other forms of opposition
against apartheid that ranged from bus boycotts to marches. Many political parties
grew out of distaste of the apartheid, including the African National Congress,
formerly the South African Native National Congress formed in 1912, and the South
African Communist Party. The African National Congress (ANC) adopted a
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Freedom Charter and created the slogan “The People Shall Govern” to guide them in
their opposition pursuits. Many people who distrusted any white involvement split
off from the ANC to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The ANC and PAC
had major campaigns against the Abolition of Passes and Documents Act, one
resulting in a massacre on March 21, 1960. The Sharpeville Massacre originated
from a PAC campaign that encouraged PAC supporters to voluntarily leave their
passes at home and offer themselves up for arrest at the nearest police station.
Despite the non-violent nature of the campaign, armed policemen dispersed the
demonstrators. Sixty-nine people were killed, most with gunshots in their backs.
This event had severe consequences for the National Party because it showed
unnecessary brutality by the government and resulted in the involvement of
international organizations like the United Nations Security Council.61 Another PAC
demonstration in Cape Town on April 6, 1960 ended in the arrest of their leader
Philip Kgosana and the banning of the PAC, ANC, and other opposition
organizations.
The ANC and PAC went underground and continued to show their animosity
through military resistance. The ANC’s military group was named Umkonto we
Sizwe and the PAC had their military group Poqo. Nelson Mandela of the ANC and
PAC leadership went abroad to gather support, but on his return Mandela was
arrested, tried for treason, found guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment on
Robben Island.

61

South African History Online. “Sharpeville”. http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governenceprojects/sharpeville/menu.htm

44

In 1966 Hendrik Verwoerd, the current National Party leader and South
African president, was assassinated. Verwoerd was succeeded by Balthazar Johannes
Vorster who continued and intensified the repressions. The economic recession in
1973 made things harder for Africans and forced thousands of them to leave their
farms and move into city slums. Apartheid opposition grew due to economic troubles
and continued discrimination; Africans felt that they had nothing to lose.
One way Africans demonstrated their anger and frustration with apartheid
discrimination was involvement in trade unions. The South African Congress of
Trade Union (SACTU), formed in the early 1950s, became the leader of the
antiapartheid struggle in the labor movement. Until the government recognized black
unions in 1979, they were competing on an unfair playing field with pro-apartheid
unions. Other black anti-apartheid unions were the National Council of Trade Unions
(NACTU), and the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). By the end of
the 1980s, work unions increased in popularity because they could be used to
safeguard jobs. Unemployment was high so any job security was important. The
National Union of Mineworkers succeeded in organizing migrant workers and in
1987 declared allegiance with the ANC and made Nelson Mandela its honorary life
president. Black trade unions were extremely active; there were 1148 strikes in 1987.
The largest trade union strike was led by the National Union of Mineworkers lasting
three weeks and involving 250,000 miners. 62 By 1990, the Congress of South
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African Trade Unions (COSATU) joined thirty-three unions together and had more
than one million members. 63
In addition to workers, the youth were key players in the liberation struggle.
Most opposition during the apartheid was generated by youth, mostly young men.
The pupils were dissatisfied with the education system and the high unemployment
level after graduation. “The Conga-like toyi-toyi dance of the ‘youth’ at UDF and
other ‘radical’ gatherings during the 1980’s was at once a metaphor for the unifying
aspirations of the front and a potent psychological means of achieving that solidarity,
at least among the participants.” 64 The Black Consciousness Movement was formed
by student Steve Biko and comprised of black South African university students.
This movement stressed the individual responsibility for liberation and realized it
could not be hasty when seeking confrontations with the government. In 1973 the
movement received working class support and strikes broke out in Durban displaying
industrial and school unrest. Soon after, when education of the Afrikaan language in
school was forced upon all students, the students organized uprisings in protest in
Soweto. The peaceful demonstrations began in the winter of 1976 but on June 16,
15,000 youths were met by armed police. Two young black students were savagely
killed, publicly demonstrating the brutality of apartheid. Soon after, the youths went
on rampage again and two whites were killed. The Soweto Revolt spread all over
South Africa and was put down harshly by the government. Some youths fled and
joined the ANC and were recruited into their military resistance group. The ANC
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was rebuilt from this student involvement and continued to show their anger and
discontent with the South African government and societal structures.
On top of student and working-class involvement, the women’s struggle was
prominent in the 1950’s. Thousands of black, colored, and Indian women joined the
Defiance Campaign in 1952 challenging apartheid laws. In 1954 the Federation of
South African Women was established and brought together women from many
political parties under one common goal. On August 9, 1956, the Federation of South
African Women (FEDSAW) organized 20,000 women to march to the government
buildings in Pretoria to present a petition against the carrying of passes by women.
This famous march became known as the Women’s March. The FEDSAW instituted
the women’s anti-pass campaign, the Women’s Charter, and their famous march to
Pretoria, which became benchmarks in the struggle and continued to inspire decades
of women until democracy was finally realized in 1994. 65 Other women’s antiapartheid organizations included the ANC Women’s League and the National Council
of African Women.
Social movements and uprisings continued as political leaders changed
positions and new legislation was passed. In 1978, Vorster resigned from Prime
Minister and became president. P.W. Botha, the current head of the National Party in
the Cape Province, won Prime Minster. Botha introduced a program called “Total
Strategy” in the efforts to contain communism and keep the apartheid. The
government was afraid of the blacks gaining power and influence, but was less
intimidated by the other ethnic minorities. Therefore, in 1984 coloreds and Indians
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were given a formal say in the ruling of the country through a tri-cameral parliament.
Angry about rent increases and the persistent exclusion of blacks in government,
residents of Johannesburg started a violent uprising against the government that
spread across the country. This disturbance was called the Vaal Triangle Riots, and
was brutally shut down by the police. In the township of Langa, twenty people were
gunned down at a funeral procession demonstrating the brutality of the event. 66
The persistent exclusion of Africans in government led to United Democratic
Front (UDF) protests. The UDF was a non-racial anti-apartheid coalition of about
400 civic, church, students, workers, and other organizations on the national,
regional, and local level, formed in 1983. The UDF united its 3 million members
over the slogan “UDF unites, Apartheid divides”. Once the UDF was banned in
1988, the South Africa Mass Democratic Movement became the informal coalition of
anti-apartheid groups. The MDM organized a campaign of civil disobedience in
anticipation of the upcoming national elections in 1989. Defying regulations, several
hundred black protesters entered whites-only hospitals and beaches. Throughout the
month, people of all races marched peacefully in cities all over the country to protest
police brutality and repressive legislation. 67
Despite original intentions to have peaceful social movements, brutal violence
erupted towards both blacks and whites so that the government put many districts
under state of emergency. Throughout the 1980’s the UDF supported armed
resistance campaigns. The government was not about to be passive, therefore, the
security forces became the true rulers of South Africa. Widespread shootings against
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demonstrators occurred as well as assassinations of prominent opponents. The UDF
and sixteen other organizations were banned in 1988 crushing this revolt.
Not every social unrest account during the apartheid years has been discussed,
but these social movements were signs that the apartheid regime would not be able to
maintain its oppressive rule without massive resistance. 68

Elites
Not only did mass movements have a large impact on the forward movement
of the country, but elites began to be involved in the idea of reform by the late 1980’s.
In 1984, Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, met with Botha and advised
him to release Nelson Mandela, which he promptly refused. However, Botha was
interested in Mandela’s political perceptions for South Africa’s future because
Mandela was still the majority of the opposition’s leader. The Minister of Justice,
Kobie Coetsee, organized for two people to meet with Mandela at the Pollsmoor
Prison. At the first meeting with Lord Bethall, Mandela stated that, “the armed
struggle was forced upon us by the government…” 69 Mandela was told by the
Minister for Law and Order, Louis le Grange that talks with the ANC could continue
in the future but the government would not agree to all Mandela’s conditions. One
condition set forward by the government was that if the ANC stopped guerilla
warfare and entered the political arena, than the government would negotiate with the
ANC; Mandela refused to agree to these terms. In the second meeting with Samuel
Dash, the Chief Counselor to the US Senate Watergate Committee, Mandela laid out
68

South African History Online. “Black Consciousness”.
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governence-projects/black-consciousness/biko/biko-frameset.htm
69
Tom Lodge. “Mandela: A Critical Life.” Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006. p 156.

49

the ANC’s essential requirements for political settlement. These included a unified
south, no artificial homelands, black participation in central parliament, and one-man
one-vote on a common roll.
On January 31, 1985 Botha made an offer at Parliament that if Mandela
renounced violence he would be set free. However, Mandela refused this offer
because he cared more about others freedom than his own. The organization of the
people (the ANC) was still banned, so until it was legalized they would continue to
fight for freedom. A few months later Mandela wrote to Minister Coetsee requesting
a meeting, but Coetsee refused to see him in jail. When Mandela was in a hospital for
an operation, Coetsee visited him and had a formal meeting. On return to the
Pollsmoor prison, Mandela was provided with his own rooms making him more
approachable by the government. Meetings up to this point were kept secret from
other ANC members.
Mandela began meeting a more diversified group of people in 1986 beginning
with members of Commonwealth Eminent Person’s Group and Coetsee on May 16.
Mandela said that if authorities withdrew soldiers and police from townships than the
ANC might suspend violence.
On December 24, 1986 Mandela was driven around Cape Town and he was
able to see the racial difference in living conditions between blacks and whites.
Throughout 1987 Mandela continued meeting with Coetsee and in May 1988
Mandela began a series of forty-seven meetings with a special committee constituted
by Coetsee. This committee was created because the government wanted more
representation before any further discussions. Coetsee would chair the committee and
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members would include senior prison officials and Dr. Neil Bernard the head of
National Intelligence Service.
At the end of 1988 Mandela was hospitalized for tuberculosis and later moved
to a bungalow on Victor Verster prison grounds where he could entertain visitors in
private. Finally, on July 5, 1989 Mandela met with President Botha. Mandela’s
objective was to bring the government and ANC to the negotiating table to talk about
the black population’s desire for majority rule in a unitary state, white’s minority
requirements to not be controlled or dominated, and that the ANC would not
renounce violence, abandon communist allies, and give up aim of majority rule. The
government made demands that were unacceptable to the ANC.
In addition to private discussions between Nelson Mandela and a few National
Party representatives, the ANC and UDF began having influence on internal political
developments. The White House of Assembly conducted general elections in may
1987 and the National Party won 52 percent of the votes while the Conservative Party
won 26 percent. Many Afrikaners wanted to return to apartheid while many white
business, community, and religious leaders wanted to end apartheid. These left-wing
supporters accepted that radical change was absolutely necessary and started to take
initiative themselves. They recognized they needed Mandela and the ANC in order to
get a peaceful solution to South African problems. A group of white South African
business leaders took a trip to Lusaka, Zambia to meet with Oliver Tambo and other
ANC leaders. In 1986 a documented calling for Mandela’s release was circulated by
the Broderbond, and in 1987 the Progressive Federal Party leader Van Zyl Slabbert
led a delegation of fifty Afrikaner intellectuals to Senegal for talks with ANC leaders.
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The ANC welcomed these discussions because they did not see a government
overthrow as possible because their Communist allies were failing. The USSR urged
ANC leaders to negotiate with apartheid leaders.
When President Botha had a stroke in 1989, he gave up his leadership of the
National Party to lessen his responsibilities while still remaining State President. The
National Party elected Frederik Willem de Klerk as its new leader. However, the
division between party leader and presidency meant that neither Botha nor de Klerk
could exercise any real power. In the September 1989 elections, the National Party
retained Parliamentary power, but de Klerk was elected president over Botha. This
change in power marks the beginning of the democratization process that will last for
the next five years.
In reflection, the apartheid time period left South Africa in disrepair and
increased the chances for reform of some kind, whether or not it would be
democratic. Violence was rampant throughout the entire country creating fear and
disruption. In the mid-1980s, over 25 percent of black deaths were unnatural cause
by homicide, gangs, or other similar reasons. High alcoholism and drug use were a
result of the widespread feeling of hopelessness of life. The distribution of income
was very unequal as well, being closely correlated with racial status. In 1983, the
disposable income per capita for Asians was 37 percent of that of whites. Coloreds
were at 26 percent of that of whites, and Africans were between 6-22 percent
depending on whether they lived in cities or rural townships. Nearly 2/3 of Africans
(4/5 of the Africans living on Reserves) were in dire poverty and in the early 1970’s
the richest 20 percent of the South African population owned 75 percent of the
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country’s wealth. The level of inequality kept increasing from the 1970s-80s and the
unemployment rate was 39 percent. Lastly, the apartheid caused education quality to
decrease. Schools stressed rote learning, not independent or analytical thinking,
which is not effective in creating a dynamic labor force. Many youth challenged the
political system using the slogan “Liberation now! Education later!” 70 Even though
their actions were understandable under the current circumstances, there were horrific
costs later when there was an entire generation with poor education.
The apartheid provided an environment that stimulated violence, discontent,
and the necessity for reform. Not only were blacks angry and involved in mass
mobilization, but many white elites were willing to meet with ANC party leaders to
discuss reform, setting up a receptive environment for the transition process.

Election of de Klerk to Election of Mandela (1989-1994)
Once de Klerk came into power he recognized that he must negotiate with
legitimate black leaders and begin a comprehensive reform of the government and
country as a whole. He stated, “there was no other alternative for South Africa. We
were on the road to total confrontation, which would have annihilated everything
which has been built up in this country.” 71 Violence and social movements forced a
transition into action.
De Klerk’s first actions included announcing that all apartheid law will be
repealed, lifting economic sanctions, and releasing political prisoners. De Klerk
began by releasing eight political prisoners, including leading ANC figures Walter
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Sisulu and Ahmed Kathrada. Also the bans on the ANC, the South African
Communist Party, the Pan-African Congress, and all other organizations were to be
lifted. In August 1990, the police and military intelligence units who implemented
covert operations like arson, intimidation, and assassination against ANC and other
groups, were disbanded. The most influential of de Klerk’s actions, however, was the
release of Nelson Mandela on February 11, 1990 from the Victor Verster prison after
27 years of imprisonment. Mandela’s presence signaled the genuine beginning of the
process of transition by which South Africa could start to rid itself of its apartheid
past. 72 Mandela’s intention was to continue the armed struggle and to create
sanctions until a democracy was in place; for the first time in many decades, South
Africans had hope for their future.
There were many influential circumstances causing the de Klerk and other
white leaders to abandon apartheid. For example, the white population decreased and
the black population increased throughout the apartheid years making black unrest a
more pressing issue. The blacks were becoming a more powerful economic force,
moving up in business positions, and millions were attending school. The black
population was now a force to be reckoned with. Furthermore, the arms embargo and
trading boycotts made the decline of the South African economy more urgent. The
failing economy put white prosperity in jeopardy and there was a lot of unrest in the
1980s. Revolts in reserves and threats from ANC guerillas resulted in many
economic, military, and moral consequences. Also, the collapse of communism
changed Afrikaner perceptions of their opponents believing that the ANC would be
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weaker with no further Soviet support for the ANC armed insurgency. 73 Radical
solutions were needed and political reform was the only answer. “At all events, there
is no doubt that de Klerk and his fellows calculated that they could control the
process of transition in such a way as to guarantee their own interests, and probably to
maintain their rule.” 74 In addition to their hope to keep power, the white government
would also gain respect from leading countries like the UK and the US if they showed
democratic prospects. 75
The transition period between February 1990 and April 1994 was bloody and
chaotic. There was heavy violence in the townships, which the ANC suspected the
government was promoting. It turned out that the ANC accusations were true and the
Inkatha received 250,000 rand from the South African police to carry out anti-ANC
activities. 76 Also, both leading parties, the ANC and NP, had internal factions. Some
ANC supporters were not willing to reconcile peacefully over past injustices. Other
militant black consciousness leaders rejected Mandela’s proposals for multiracial
government and demanded black control over future decision-making institutions.
Some NP supporters wanted de Klerk to step down, while others pressured him to
move more boldly toward multiracial government. 77 Furthermore, once all
opposition organizations were legalized in February, violence erupted across the
country. The ANC, UDF, and COSATU fought the Inkatha in Natal and by August
the fighting spread to Transvaal. 78

73

Tom Lodge. Mandela: A Critical Life.
Robert Ross. A Concise History of South Africa, 185.
75
Tom Lodge. Mandela: A Critical Life.
76
Robert Ross. A Concise History of South Africa.
77
Library of Congress. “A Country Study: South Africa”.
78
Roger B. Beck, The History of South Africa.
74

55

Questions of politics and governance were brought up, such as who would
rule the country? In whose interests? What would be the administrative and
bureaucratic structure of the country? First, constitutional continuity was decided
upon which meant that whatever was agreed upon must be enacted by South African
Parliament. Also, the government that would come out of the transition was to be, in
all respects, the lawful successor of the one that went into the process. It was also
decided that the transition process must be completed within five years, before the
next parliamentary elections. Despite the appearance of cooperation, all the groups
involved in the process of negotiations were ready to use force in addition to
bargaining. Excluding the Democratic Party, all other parties had their own private,
clandestine army to make sure they got what they wanted. 79 According to Higley and
Burton, the beginning of this transition was not an example of a consensual elite, but
most likely a fragmented elite because of its weak integration and wide
differentiation. The elites have split up into so many different groups but they
refused to cooperate with each other. 80
Not knowing how the population truly felt about the transition to democracy,
de Klerk called a general election over the population’s feelings about the creation of
a new constitution by the conservative party. Eighty percent of registered white
voters showed up, and 68.7 percent of them voted pro-reform, giving de Klerk the
consent needed to continue with reform plans. Starting May 2, 1990, representatives
from the ANC and the government had secret meetings to discuss conditions for
starting formal constitutional negotiations. The Groote Schuur Minute was produced
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at these negotiations, which called for the release of political prisoners and to allow
exiles to return. Throughout this time de Klerk kept repealing apartheid legislation,
including the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act. Now beaches, benches,
restaurants, bathrooms, hospitals and all other public places were open to all
ethnicities. 81
In June 1990 de Klerk and Mandela met for the first time. On August 6, 1990
the two leading parties met again in Pretoria where Mandela announced that he was
ending the armed struggle. A truce was made between the government and the ANC
even though many groups in South Africa were still at war. Mandela soon afterwards
met with the Zulu leader Buthelezi in an effort to comfort Zulu fears of ANC
domination. 82 Mandela knew that they must not ignore the reality of ethnic groups
still prominent in South African society while creating the new constitution and
government.
By June 1991, most apartheid restrictions had been abolished except for
several political legislations. When de Klerk addressed the radical rights of the
National Party in Ventersdorp, home of the militant Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging

(AWB), there was a violent street battle outside the building during his speech. The
fight was between police and armed AWB who wanted to stop the rally. This was the
first time that South African Police used armed forced against white demonstrators.
This battle showed the uncertainties that the AWB felt going under black rule. They
were afraid they would be subordinate to blacks and demonstrated that they were not
going to make transitioning easy for the ANC and National Party unless their needs
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were met as well. The National Peace Accord was signed by 27 delegates of political
organizations and national and homeland governments in September 1991. This
accord set the codes of conduct for all parties in the process, including the police. 83
December 20th was the beginning of the Convention for a Democratic South
Africa (CODESA), which brought together the government and eighteen political
parties to sign a Declaration of Intent. Mandela was present at these talks because he
was now President of ANC. The declaration was a commitment of all parties to “an
undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship… free from
apartheid or any other form of discrimination or domination.” 84 They agreed to an
interim government for the transition period and an elected constituent assembly to
serve as the National Parliament. However, at CODESA’s second meeting in May
1992, talks collapsed. The National Party wanted a veto over any decision made by
the Constitution Assembly and disagreed on power sharing, majority rule, and
centralized power. The ANC refused to accept these alterations and started a
campaign, supported by the SACP and COSATU, of rolling mass action to force
government concessions. As a result of mass action the Boipatong Massacre and
Bisho Massacre occurred in June and September 1992 respectively, when the
government met the demonstrators with force.
The Boipatong Massacre happened on June 17, 1992 when de Klerk visited
the settlement. His presence made the Zulu residents angry, especially because he
had a large police contingent with him. The police in armored vehicles began to fire
and killed many people. It was widely believed that the police were involved in
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supporting the Zulu’s and other anti-ANC groups to hinder the democratic transition.
This massacre and the supposed police involvement prompted Mandela to break off
formal talks with the government for nine months. The ANC threatened to withdraw
entirely unless the government made greater efforts to end violence and to curtail
covert police support for the Inkatha Freedom Party. 85 The event also reconfirmed
the necessity of ANC’s mass action campaign so the campaign continued through
July. In the beginning of August, there was a general boycott for two days that hurt
the failing economy even more. In September, the ANC tried to extend the mass
action campaign to the homelands. On September 7, the ANC sponsored a march to
Bisho, the capital of the Ciskei territory, to overthrow the regime of Brigadier Oupa
Qozo in order to hasten the re-incorporation of Ciskei into the republic. The police
open fired when the marchers broke through police barriers and 29 people were
killed, 200 wounded.
The breakdown of CODESA, the Boipatong massacre, and the Bisho
massacre forced the National Party and the ANC to realize that a negotiated
settlement had to be found. However, it was decided that this negotiation must be
made in private by leaders and then presented as a finished product to their
supporters. In September 1992, Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC Security General, and
Roelf Meyer, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, met for nineteen days to create
an agreement that CODESA never could. On September 26, Mandela and de Klerk
signed a Record of Understanding, a document showing that the ANC agreed to
resume negotiations once the government agreed to release more political prisoners,
fence migrant hostels that housed many ANC supporters, and prohibited the carrying
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of traditional weapons. The ANC accepted the sunset clauses, which safeguarded
white civil servant jobs and allowed for a coalition government. Any party with 20
percent or more of the national vote would have a Vice President in the coalition
government and cabinet seats were distributed to parties with more than five percent
of the national vote. Also, Mandela and de Klerk agreed to establish a constitutional
assembly to construct a final constitution and a five-year transitional Government of
National Unity. However, this compromise was only between the ANC and National
Party, excluding smaller parties. In retaliation, Buthelezi the IFP leader formed a new
alliance called the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG). This included
nineteen organizations, including the IFP, Afrikaner People’s Union, and the White
Conservative Party, who wanted to protect ethnic rights of minorities such as the Zulu
and whites.
A negotiating council of twenty-six parties met at the World Trade Center
outside Johannesburg April 1, 1993. The negotiation continued despite many
disturbances such as an assassination and an armored car being driving into the World
Trade Center. At the end of the council, the negotiation included the type of
government that would be installed, the division of South Africa’s provinces, and
how to safeguard previous government employees. First, it was agreed upon that a
constituent assembly would be elected and for the first years after the election there
would be a Government of National Unity in which all parties who had over five
percent of the vote would have ministerial office and in which a 2/3 majority was
needed to write the constitution. The assembly would have full legislative powers
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except for a few safeguards. 86 Secondly, the organization of South Africa’s
provinces would need to change to provide more equality in voting. The ANC
wanted a central government but the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party
wanted regional governments so they could control many sectors of society without
controlling the central government party. The ANC agreed to provincial governments
but realized how the country was currently split up was ineffective because it was too
unwieldy. Therefore, South Africa was re-divided into nine provinces. Thirdly, there
was the issue of white workers in the government and how to make sure
unemployment and unrest rose in the white population. Forty percent of employed
Afrikaners worked for the government and a huge constituency of South Africans and
Bantustans were in the civil service, police, and defense forces. Similar to the sunset
clauses mentioned previously, it was decided that for ten years after the transfer of
government all state employers had job stability. Every party agreed to the interim
constitution except for the Conservative Party, Inkatha, and the KwaZulu government
who walked out of the meetings. This interim constitution was adopted by the tricameral parliament in December 1993 meaning that constitutional continuity was
achieved. Furthermore, the date was set for the first universal election in South
African history for April 27-29, 1994 when the population would vote on a new
constituent, legislative assembly, and president.
The interim constitution took effect and caused immediate discontent.
According to the constitution, seven million people who were part of the Transkei,
Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda Bantustan populations were reincorporated into
South Africa. However, Lucas Mangope, the leader of the Bophuthatswana’s said
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they would not participate in the elections. Mangope finally consented when his
people demonstrated their desire to vote in a four-day protest. Following Mangope’s
lead, the Ciskei ruler resigned on March 22 allowing his group to vote on election day
as well. However, Buthelezi still opposed the constitution and refused to participate
in the election unless the Zulu Kingship and territory had status and a guarantee that
the Inkatha wouldn’t be discriminated against in the new government. After the
Inkatha conducted a mass march to the national headquarter of the ANC, de Klerk
and Mandela agreed to their terms and Inkatha was added to the ballot.
The last obstacle that the ANC and National Party had to deal with was the
Afrikaner nationalists and rough neck racists of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
(AWB). The ANC met with Afrikaner nationalist General Constand Viljoen
established volkstaat, the establishment of self-determination for the Afrikaners
minority in accordance with federal principles, in the effort to preserve Afrikaans
religion, culture, and language. Viljoen eventually agreed to participate in the
elections after the AWB was defeated in an armed disagreement with the
Bophuthatswana. Viljoen recognized that participating in the election would be the
best way to achieve his objectives.
In the days leading up to the election there was violence. On April 25, a car
bomb in Johannesburg killed nine people, and on the day before elections started on
April 26 there was a car bomb in Johannesburg airport injuring thirteen people.
However, on the election days there was no violence allowing twenty million people
to vote.
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April 27-29, 1994 was the first democratic election that South African history
had seen. The elections ran relatively smoothly despite many allegations that some
local powers stuffed or hid ballot boxes and the results had to be determined by
negotiation in some areas. As a result, the ANC won 62.65 percent of the vote, barely
missing the 2/3 majority needed to write the constitution on its own. The ANC also
got seven out of nine provinces, losing the provinces that were mostly countryside.
The Inkatha won 10.54 percent of the national total winning control of KwaZuluNatal. The National Party won 20.04 percent of the vote and was able to nominate de
Klerk as one of the Vice Presidents. The ANC was not able to secure 100 percent of
the votes because some people feared that the party was godless and violent, they
distrusted its candidate for premier, there was widespread worry about job security,
and they disliked the ANC’s habits of deference. Nonetheless, on May 10, 1994,
Nelson Mandela took oath as President of South Africa, with de Klerk and Thabo
Mbeki as his Vice Presidents.

Conclusion
South Africa is a country familiar with strife, starting from its colonization in
1652 by the Dutch. Controversy grew and was at its height during the apartheid in
the mid-1900s. Through social movements and political unrest, however, the public
displayed its anger and desire for change. Once the ruling government realized that
the country would not be able to survive in the present situation, it looked towards
democracy. From 1989 to 1994 South Africa turned its future around by negotiating
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a government that represented all the people. In spite of adversity, the strong willed
country embraced its past in an effort to democratize.
I am not only interested in the success of South Africa, but in the process the
country took to democratize. Was it solely elite driven following Higley and
Burton’s theories, or did the masses play a role in the outcome? By first examining
the elite negotiations and then mass mobilization leading up to and during the
transition, it will be discovered whether South Africa can be applied to one of the
theories presented by Higley, Burton, Gunther, Tarrow, or Bermeo.
The elites in South Africa began negotiating privately years before the official
transition began in 1989 when de Klerk became president. President Botha had
begun making preliminary advancements towards a democracy by opening up to
Nelson Mandela, leader of the opposition. But these actions were stalled before any
real improvement could be made. De Klerk on the other hand, made strong efforts by
making his negotiations public as well as private. He released many political
prisoners and continued discussions with Mandela and other political party leaders.
Mandela began to take a lead role in transition coming up with his own terms and
reaching out to leaders, like Buthelezi, on his own to make peace statewide.
However, do these actions fit into the clean-cut categories prescribed by
Higley and Burton? Higley and Burton argue that first the elites must become
consensual through either elite settlement or general elite convergence, to have a
chance at successful democratization. In order for a group to be considered
consensual elites, they must make an effort to agree on the roles of the political game
while still holding different ideas and values. They do not push their disagreements
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to violence once they agree to abide by common codes of political conduct and there
is an extensive web of interpersonal relationships over all factions. The elites in
South Africa did agree to the rules of the political game, but not immediately.
Nelson Mandela was still encouraging armed resistance against the National
Party until certain conditions were met in favor of the ANC. The ANC and the
National Party were the first two elite groups to agree to civil political rules when
Mandela announced that he was ending the armed struggle in 1990. However, other
political parties and elites were not as supportive of the new environment. For a
while, most parties had their own private, clandestine armies to make sure their
concerns were considered. The National Peace Accord between 27 delegates in 1991
set the codes of conduct for future political interaction. Even though there is violence
up until the election and some leaders refused to participate in the election until a few
days prior, the election still had all major political parties on the ballot with an
agreement to democratic political rules.
How did the elites transform into a consensual elite group? The elites did not
come to a conclusive decision that they would all follow the new political rules at one
specific meeting. Does that mean that an elite settlement did not occur because it was
not a distinct turning point, or can elite settlements happen over a period of years?
Higley and Burton argue that speed is a key feature in settlements. “It appears that
elite settlements are accomplished quickly or not at all… In none of the cases under
discussion did a settlement take much longer than a year.”87 They clarify that an elite
settlement does not have to be complete and secure within the year, but the initial
87
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settlement must be consolidated within that time frame. If the initial settlement was
between Mandela and de Klerk, it could be argued that the settlement happened
within one year, but it could also be argued that agreements between the two parties
happened much earlier between Mandela and Coetsee during Botha’s presidency and
didn’t end until August 1990 when Mandela agreed to stop armed resistance. Even
then, the last of the elites didn’t agree until 1994. The elites did complete their
democratic transition in five years, but it does not make the requirements set up by
Higley and Burton. It appears that South Africa made a series of elite settlements
culminating in a success. South Africa may be one of the first countries that
succeeded at an elite settlement that took more than one year to consolidate, or an
elite settlement is not the correct category in which to place South Africa.
Another possibility is that South Africa went through a general elite
convergence. An elite convergence happens in two steps and is a slower process than
settlements. First, some warring factions collaborate in electoral politics to mobilize
a reliable electoral majority. After several successful elections other elite factions,
who originally challenged the coalition and democratic rules, agree to participate in
the democratic election so they can continue representing their own ideologies. In
South Africa, there were no elections that occurred in between the last apartheid
election and the first national democratic election. However, a convergence fits
South Africa in other aspects such as having two warring factions negotiate first and
the other parties follow at a later time.
South Africa could also be described as a generosity moment, according to
Hislope. A generosity moment is when dominant ethnic groups promote dialogue
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and cooperation with minorities to meet their demands. 88 South Africa had extreme
ethnic violence approaching the democratic transition including massacres and ethnic
wars in the reserves. During the transition, anti-system and semi-loyal parties were
co-opted, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Zulu, or marginalized like the
Afrikaner Resistance Movement. 89 However, the ANC began to talk with elites from
parties other than the National Party. Not only did the ANC appease white interests
through the sunset clause, but Mandela worked with every major South African
political figure during the transition, except for the neo-Nazi leader. Mandela said,
“It is true that our policies are nonracial, but let us be realistic about it. There are
different ethnic groups in this country and ethnicity – especially because of the
policies of the government – is still a dangerous threat to us.” 90 Yugoslavia had
recently fallen apart because separate nationalities had been forced together, and
South Africa was determined to not succumb to the same fate. If the ANC did not
take into account Zulu interests, the Zulu could have initiated many political
problems. 91 The ANC and NP elites worked together to provide opportunities for all
ethnic groups in South Africa allowing it to move forward towards a democracy.
The South African case does not flawlessly fit either type of process described
by Higley and Burton, raising the question if it is unique in this matter or if there is a
pattern. It is evident that elite involvement was an imperative part of the
democratization process, especially the involvement of all ethnic minorities.
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However, what was the role of the masses? Is a consensual elite all a country needs
to succeed? Or does mass action play a vital role in showing the elites what the
people want and the direction that the country must proceed? It was shown that there
were many social movements and discussions between elite members before the
democratic transition even occurred, which demonstrated to the government that
change was inevitable.
However, is it important to have social movements before the transition
begins to promote change, or do they need to continue throughout the transition? It is
very possible that without the social movements throughout the apartheid, the
National Party would have been able to continue ruling. The demonstrations,
marches, and revolts forced the ruling government to reconsider the future of South
Africa to prevent complete chaos and failure. De Klerk knew that the National Party
would not be able to keep ruling unilaterally for very much longer and therefore
looked towards democracy as a way to maintain some power in the future.
Social movements during the transition were also important because they kept
the transition on the right path. Without the Boipatong Massacre and other protests
and violence, minority groups might not have been equally represented and the ANC
and National Party could have created their own government. According to Richard
Ballard, Adam Habib, Imraan Valodia, and Elke Zuern, social movements played an
integral role in the outcome of the transition.
Since the 1970s [there has] been a heightened level of social
organization in South Africa, especially in urban areas through the
activity of unions and civics. Social movements in South Africa
played a vital part in precipitating and defining the terms of the
transition to democracy, and indeed the liberation movement was
arguably one of the quintessential social movements of the 20th
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century. The ANC, UDF, COSATU, NGO’s and civics formed a
collective mass of democratic energy which – in combination with
economic difficulties, external political pressure, and changing geopolitical circumstances – resulted in the negotiated revolution of the
early 1990s. 92
Through the research performed, it is clear that both social movements and
elites influenced the transition, and the combination of both enabled South Africa to
be a successful case. In this situation, both social movements and elites were needed
to produce the democratic outcomes. This conclusion cannot be applied to all case
studies, so these same questions will also be considered in the case studies of Serbia
and Haiti.
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Chapter 3
Democratization in Serbia
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Introduction
As a post-communist country, Serbia has a very different history than South
Africa. Serbia’s challenging issue was not ethnic divisions, but political ones. Once
communism failed in 1989, signified by the fall of the Berlin Wall, Serbia’s internal
political strife became rampant. Serbia was part of a large Yugoslavia until 1992
when Yugoslavia split up violently leaving only Serbia and Montenegro in the
Federation of Yugoslavia. Then, early in the new millennium Serbia and Montenegro
joined together in a Union, which lasted three years until 2006, when both countries
became independent.
Throughout this time, Serbia’s politics were infiltrated with killings, uprisings,
political purges, and short-termed alliances. Slobodan Milošević, who some believe
was one of the worst dictators in the world, was President of Serbia from 1989 to
1997 and the President of the Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000.
One question that will be examined is when did the democratic transition take
place in Serbia? Unlike South Africa, Serbia does not have a distinct beginning and
end point of its democratic transition. After giving a brief chronology of Serbia’s
history from 1989 to the present, possible transition dates will be investigated. Figure
1, Serbian and Yugoslavian Leaders, is provided on page 162 as a visual aid for the
confusing political history of Serbia. Also, elite involvement and social movements
will be examined to determine if one or the other has a greater effect on
democratization success.
Serbia is being used as a case study because it provides a dissimilar
background and presents alternative issues to South Africa. Since Serbia is a post-

71

communist country, it has a very different background than other countries
worldwide, dealing with issues of stateness, economy, and political disruptions. This
provides a way to examine how social movements and elite negotiations affect
political transitions differently than in South Africa. Serbia, along with South Africa
and Haiti, fits the MDD-SO model by having a very different and controversial
background, but having a similarly successful transition.

History of Serbia
The Rise of Milošević (1987-1997)
Milošević began showing tendencies of a dictator before he was inaugurated
as president in 1989. Milošević became a member of the Communist Party in the
1980’s and immediately began attacking Serbian leadership who disagreed with his
views of nationalism. One of his first targets was Dragiša Pavlović, president of the
Belgrade Party, who criticized government policies in public and denounced Serbian
nationalism. 93 In 1987, someone shot four of Pavlović’s comrades and wounded six
others. Anyone who became associated with Pavlović, or any other of Milošević’s
enemies, had to tread carefully. Ivan Stambolić, an old friend of Milošević, sided
with Pavlović and both Pavlović and Stambolić were forced to resign from politics. 94
In December 1987, Milošević gained power over the Serbian Communist Party in an
intra-party coup without elections or political participation of people outside the
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leadership of the party. 95 Milošević, however, attempted to show that he was prodemocratic by addressing a large gathering in the summer of 1988. The gatherings,
called “rallies for truth” or the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” were held throughout
Serbia and were to promote nationalism and keep Kosovo part of Serbia. In
Milošević’s address, he stated that he believed that these demonstrations were a
democratic reaction. However, as time progressed, it became clear that Milošević
only supported demonstrations that promoted his own ideologies and he condemned
all other public actions of speech and assembly. 96
Soon after, there was a revolt of Kosovo Serbs intending to halt Serb
emigration from Kosovo and change Kosovo’s constitutional status in Serbia. This
turned into a political free-for-all; it was the first time that Milošević discovered the
power of nationalism and Serbian nationalism became a concern. Milošević was
called a Bolshevik for trying to prevent the collapse of another communist regime.
Despite these uncertainties by the people, Milošević became president of Serbia in
1989 because popular elections were never held. 97 Not long after, on October 17,
1989 the Yugoslav Party had a meeting of the presidency and tried to vote Milošević
out of office but was unsuccessful. 98
A month later the Berlin Wall fell and Milošević appeared to still be the sole,
uncontested leader. 99 Milošević called for a congress of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia to revote for the party leadership because the Communist Party of
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Yugoslavia was at an end, at least under that name. Milošević hand-picked most of
the delegates to ensure he would win; however the Slovenian leadership was against
him and actually walked out of Congress to show their discontent. 100 Most of the
public was by this time against communism and demanded reform, especially because
of the recent hyperinflation. 101 In response, the Communist Party of Serbia was
renamed the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Milošević managed to keep the
communist party’s organizational influence and co-opt much of the opposition. 102
The SPS party became nationalistic; Milošević was desperate to weaken potential
reform that would threaten the communist’s monopoly of power. 103 In early 1990,
opposition parties began appearing and a law was passed in July allowing multiple
party elections. Milošević’s main opposition came from the Serbian Resistance
Movement and nationalist governments in other surrounding republics. In September
1990, the SPS created a new constitution that would be used until 2006.
Opposition parties began demonstrating their abilities in November 1990.
The parties declared an election boycott and an anti-election campaign to discourage
people from voting in the December elections. The largest opposition party to the
SPS was the Serbian Renewal Movement led by Vuk Drašković who advocated
extreme national positions. There was also the Democratic Union led by Vojvodina
Magyars, the Civic Alliance, and the Democratic Party.
In the December elections in 1990, opposition parties did participate and
resulted in no convincing victory or defeat for the present ruling regime. The SPS
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won 46.1 percent of the votes, which were the most votes won even though it was not
the majority. Even though opposition representatives were in parliament, the
parliament was not democratic because of corrupt elections. Also in 1990, Milošević
appointed the next Yugoslavian president and prime minister, Dobrica Ćosić and
Milan Panić respectively. Despite Milošević’s plan for picking these individuals,
Ćosić and Panić began denouncing Milošević’s autocratic rule and presenting
resistance. Milošević refused to resign his position and became on bad terms with
both Ćosić and Panić; he tried to oust Panić twice without success. Finally, in 1992,
Milošević replaced Ćosić and Panić with Zoran Lilić and Radoje Kontić.
After Milošević reconfirmed his presidency in 1991, rallies and mass protests
broke out which he quickly banned. Beginning on March 9, students protested in
response to the exclusion of opposition parties from TV news coverage and that the
state TV presented one-sided stories on national conflicts. They demanded the
resignation of the state TV station directors. 104 However, the students could not
develop into a new balance of political forces to present strong competition to the
SPS. The limit of their success was in exposing the regime’s failure of legitimacy.
Since demonstrations were banned, police were brought in from all over the country
to attempt to prevent people from assembling. Despite police attempts, 100,000200,000 gathered in Republic Square in Belgrade. Water cannons, clubs, and tear gas
were used against the students and many arrests were made, including Drašković
being sent to prison. For four days, people gathered on Terazije square in another
urban neighborhood to voice their concerns. Speakers climbed up onto the fountain
to address the crowd. They called themselves the “Terazije Parliament” and formed a
104

Eric G. Gordy. “The Culture of Power in Serbia.”

75

list of demands to the government, including the release of demonstrators from prison
including Drašković; the resignation of Minister of Police, Minister of Interior, and
Director of RTB station; and unimpeded operations of their own student
radiobroadcasts. The government met all demands. The media portrayed these
demonstrations as violent, but it was in fact the police that brought the violence.
In response to the student protest, Milošević started a pro-regime
demonstration on March 11 at Ušće. The Women’s Movement for the Preservation
of Yugoslavia invited people to come support the President and Serbia. Several
thousand SPS supporters came, but significantly less than student demonstrations
across town. The student demonstrations and the intense military response showed
that there was no toleration for rallies and defeated the possibility of a democratic
transition in the near future.
The Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Šešelj was formed in 1991 and
Šešelj became Milošević’s favorite opposition politician. In the 1991 elections,
Šešelj was elected into Parliament defeating his opponent in the Democratic Party
with his extreme nationalist positions. 105
On June 25, 1991, Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia and war
started. Over the next two years, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke
up as wars were fought and Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina became
independent. Macedonia left Yugoslavia peacefully. War with these countries was
an opportunity for Milošević to brand making all opposition forces as traitors. In
1992, the two remaining republics of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, formed a
new federation called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
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Serbians were still not happy with Milošević after Yugoslavia broke up. In
1992, there was a huge student protest, supported by faculty, at the University of
Belgrade. Faculty and students decided they had to say “Enough!” to everything that
was going on, including the Bosnian War and UN resolutions and sanctions
excommunicating Serbia from the world community. The first phase of the protest
was tens of thousands of students protesting for twenty-six days. They took over
classrooms and auditoriums on the university campus, private businesses lent
electronic equipment, and political speakers came. Mass gatherings held in the
Student Square and political marches also occurred during this twenty-six day period.
Their demands included disbanding the National Assembly and the government of
Serbia because of their incompetence, and the resignation of Milošević. None of
these demands were met during this time, however it showed that there were
thousands of citizens with the same ideology. On August 5, 1992, the government
passed a law taking over control of the University; this only made students more
persistent. 106 Other forms of protest were also used: pacifists held demonstrations
praying for Milošević’s resignation and citizens protested the Siege of Sarajevo by
marching past Milošević’s headquarters. Armed vehicles and police suppressed
demonstrations and protests like those just mentioned.
In the 1992 parliamentary elections, SPS won 28.8 percent of the votes and
the SRS won 22.6 percent. However, at this time, the SRS and SPS were allies,
which allowed the SPS majority control. In the Serbian presidential elections the
same year, Milošević won 2.5 million votes and Panić, the previous prime minister of
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Yugoslavia, won 1.5 million votes. Panić did well considering his campaign lasted
only one week and Milošević had control over the media.
Opposition grew especially through the Democratic Party (DP). Dragoljub
Mićunović, as the Democratic Party’s first president, hoped to provide a strong and
unified opposition against the SPS. However, the Democratic Party had internal
disputes and therefore split up into four parties. One party that resulted was a
continuation of the Democratic Party but with different leadership. Zoran Đinđić was
a major supporter of Mićunović before the 1992 elections, however, after a poor
number of votes and winning only a small number of seats in the Serbian and
Yugoslav parliaments, Đinđić exploited the internal discontent to oust Mićunović.
For the 1993 elections, Đinđić took office of party president for the Democratic
Party. 107 Dragoljub Mićunović took over one of the factions named the Democratic
Centre. Another faction of the DS was the Democratic Party of Serbia led by
Vojislav Koštunica; he didn’t make allies with other opposition groups because he
wanted to stay “ideologically pure” making him not a large threat. 108 The last faction
was the Liberal Party led by Nikola Milošević and Kosta Čavoški. There were up to
130 parties formed in Serbia, however there was too much internal strife between the
parties to unite and present a strong opposition to Milošević and the SPS.
In the December 1993 parliamentary elections, SPS won 36.7 percent,
Democratic Movement of Serbia coalition 16.7 percent, and the SRS 13.9 percent.
Even though the SPS won more votes than the previous election in 1992, the SRS was
not an ally anymore because of the weakening relationship between Šešelj and
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Milošević. Milošević hoped that the organized-crime boss and paramilitary
commander Željko Ražnatović-Arkan would get enough votes to become his next ally
after SRS, but Arkan didn’t receive enough votes to even get one parliament seat.
From this election, Milošević’s SPS party did not have parliament majority. In
January 1996, all opposition parties walked out of the parliament chamber because
they all agreed parliament was no longer functional and declared they would hold
their own parallel parliament. 109
The largest parties, including the Socialists, the Yugoslav United Left led by
Mijana Marković, the SRM led by Drašković, and the Radical Party led by Šešelj, set
the political tone. However, Milošević slowly began to purge Serbian leaders of the
opposition and his own party to maintain control. First, Šešelj and members of his
party were removed from parliament after insulting Mirjana Marković, Milošević’s
wife, and were later arrested. Second, Drašković was beaten and arrested after he led
a protest and was not released until several months after when he was on the brink of
death. Not only did Milošević begin to target his opposition, but also members of his
own party the Socialist Party. He got rid of Borislav Jović, Mihajlo Marković, and
Milorad Vučelić at the Socialist Party Congress in March 1996.
In 1996, the Prudent Revolution began, led by Koštunica and Đinđić. Its first
effort was to form the Zajedno Coalition, or Together Coalition, to bring together
many different opposition parties under one goal. Đinđić and Drašković were the
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leaders of Zajedno, but Koštunica refused to partake in the coalition because his did
not trust Drašković. 110
At the 1996 municipal elections, Zajedno won in the second round of local
elections in fourteen of the most important cities and towns in Serbia. However,
Milošević refused to recognize this victory. 111 To defend the opposition’s victory,
demonstrations spread across many municipalities in Serbia led by Zajedno. In
Belgrade more than 100,000 people gathered each day supported by Drašković and
Đinđić. Students joined the rallies and at the end of each day, marchers gathered in
Republic Square where Drašković, Đinđić, and Vesna Vesic, encouraged peaceful
tactics. These demonstrations went on for weeks and there was also a “Serbian Air
force” when thousands of paper airplanes were launched at the RTB studios.
Milošević refused to address the demonstrators saying that they promoted nondemocratic ideals and should not be supported by a democratic government. 112
Police reinforcements were sent to Belgrade to stop the demonstrations. The state
finally yielded to protestors and international pressure to recognize the results and
Đinđić became the first democratically elected mayor of Belgrade on February 21,
1997.
Even though it appeared that that many opposition parties were beginning to
work together, Zajedno disbanded in June 1997. This could have been caused by
Drašković’s statement that he could achieve future victories without the coalition. 113
Another possible reason for the coalition breakup is that Đinđić did not follow
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through with their negotiations and did not support Drašković in the presidential
elections. The opposition self-destructed.
In July 1997 Milošević reached the end of his second and last term as Serbian
President. Determined to not reach the end of his political career here, he ran and was
elected for President of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in very corrupt elections
where his supporters watched all voters to ensure they voted for Milošević. He was
inaugurated on July 27, 1997. Elections for presidency and parliament in Serbia were
now open since Milošević’s end of term. Koštunica and Đinđić boycotted the
elections unless certain conditions like fair media coverage were met. Drašković
came in third place in the presidential elections, after Milošević’s supported candidate
Milan Milutinović and Šešelj. Drašković believed he lost because of the boycott led
by Koštunica and Đinđić and he wanted revenge. Drašković, joined by the SPS and
SRS, voted to remove Đinđić as mayor. In a presidential runoff election Šešelj won,
but the SPS candidate was declared President because of “phantom votes” from
Kosovo. For parliament, Milošević needed a coalition partner and looked to
Drašković, who agreed but subsequently lost all popular support for future
elections. 114
Montenegro began to sever economic ties with Serbia by forming a new
economic policy, adopting the Deutsche Mark for currency, and carrying out proindependence policies. In November 1997 there were bitterly contested elections in
Montenegro that were declared free and fair by international monitors. Milo
Đukanović became Montenegro’s president but Milošević formulated a campaign to
undermine his government.
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There were many deep social divisions in Serbia pertaining to the political
party individuals supported. For example, there was an age discrepancy. The older
generations supported the SPS and young individuals supported opposition parties
like SPO, DS, and SRS. There were also divisions based on where people lived, for
example urban or rural areas. Rural areas tended to support the SPS more because
they would benefit the most from communism and socialism. Another prominent
social division was between education levels. The more education an individual had,
the more likely they would support opposition groups instead of the SPS; in other
words, support for SPS decreased with education. 115 This made any type of
unification difficult because citizens in the same family would disagree on party
ideologies. Also, many people did not welcome the introduction to democracy
because they saw it as the “break up of Yugoslavia” and an “anarchy”. 116 Since
people did not see democracy as an attractive future regime, Giuseppe Di Palma’s
idea of crafting would have to occur by changing the word choice used to describe
democracy to get people interested and engaged. 117

The Fall of Milošević (1997-2001)
The Kosovo issue became more prominent in 1997 when the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) started armed resistance. Their main goal was to secure
independence for Kosovo. 118 The KLA rebelled against Serbian rule a year later and
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Serb forces launched a brutal crackdown. 119 Milošević instructed police and military
forces against the KLA which led to atrocities against civilian noncombatants. Many
ethnic Albanians were displaced from Kosovo or killed by Serbian troops and
police. 120 In response to Milošević’s brutal treatment of Kosovo, NATO bombed
Serbia for 78 days, which set back the economy and crippled civilian
infrastructure. 121 The United Nations Security Council authorized an international
civil and military presence in Kosovo under UN auspices and a resolution called for
UN interim administration of Kosovo. The UN also authorized an international civil
presence to facilitate a process to determine Kosovo’s status. International forces,
including the UN Mission in Kosovo and the NATO-led security force KFOR, moved
into Kosovo. 122 In 1999 Kosovo was made a UN protectorate under the UN Mission
in Kosovo. 123 Both Đinđić and Koštunica supported Milošević’s goal to preserve
Kosovo within Serbia but opposed the full-scale organized displacement of Albanian
peoples of the region. Đinđić and Koštunica continued to work hard to oust
Milošević from power since there was still a huge disagreement among elites about
the Kosovo issue and other national concerns.
Opposition grew as the 2000 Yugoslavian Presidential elections drew near.
Milošević continued to dominate organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavian
government. His party, the SPS, did not have majority in either the federal or Serbian
parliaments, but it dominated the governing coalitions and held all the key
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administrative posts. Also, Milošević had control over the Serbian police, a heavily
armed battalion of 100,000 men responsible for internal security and had committed
serious human rights abuses. In May 2000, Belgrade citizens protested against the
Serbian government’s takeover of the city’s independent Studio B TV station. This
protest was put down by brutal police repression. 124
Milošević decided to call the elections early because he believed he would
easily win since the opposition had never showed lasting cooperation and success in
the past. He set the date for September 24. The Democratic Opposition of Serbia
(DOS), a coalition of 18 parties, became the lead opposition to Milošević. Koštunica
accepted the DOS invitation as their presidential candidate and Đinđić became his
campaign manager. Koštunica worked to travel and visit all of Serbia meeting with
citizens individually and at rallies. The independent media and the Otpor
(Resistance) Student Organization were both very helpful in supporting Koštunica’s
campaign. 125 Serbians saw Koštunica as the first viable opposition alternative to
Milošević.
Koštunica was victorious at the September elections, however Milošević and
his party claimed that Milošević had won. The regime once more was not obeying its
own electoral laws. 126 The DOS called for a strike and massive demonstration in the
center of Belgrade on October 5 unless the regime recognized Koštunica’s victory.
More than half a million people from Belgrade and surrounding municipalities
gathered in front of the government buildings. The Čačak mayor and Belgrade mayor
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both arrived on bulldozers. The demonstrators stormed the buildings despite the
teargas from police. 127 By early evening the opposition controlled everything of
importance and Koštunica finalized negotiations with Milošević.
The DOS was a broad coalition of 18 anti-Milošević parties and was short
lived. However, it showed determination and cooperation in 2000 and forced
Milošević to step down from Yugoslav President on October 5. Koštunica was joined
by Zoran Đinđić as Prime Minister of Serbia and Koštunica brought an end to
international isolation by gaining membership of the UN, OSCE, IMF, Council of
Europe, and other organizations. Sanctions from the US and EU were lifted and
secured financial aid from international agencies and governments.
This election is seen by many as the turning point for Serbia and Yugoslavia.
The election led to the defeat of illiberal political forces and a victory for liberal
opposition. 128 According to Freedom House, Yugoslavia went from being not free to
partly free after the 2000 elections.
However, this election was not the end of all Serbia’s problems. Turf wars
and gangs took at least 30 lives in 2000, including three paramilitary warlords and
one Defense Minister. 129 These secret gangs have become more dangerous in the
past decade when sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia. Of the people who were
killed included Vladan (Clubs) Kovacevic, the best friend of First Son Marko
Milošević, shot and killed 1997; Zoran (Rifle Butt) Todorovic, head of First Lady
Mirjana Marković’s Yugoslav Left Party, killed 1997; Zeljko (Arkan) Raznatovic,
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notorious war criminal, killed January 2000; Bosko Perosevic, a top official of
Milošević’s own Socialist Party, killed April 2000; Zivorad (Zika) Petrovic, Yugoslav
Airlines president and one of Slobo’s childhood friends, killed April 2000. 130
Finally, on April 1, 2001 Milošević was arrested and charged with misuse of
state funds and abuse of office. 131 By getting rid of Milošević, Serbia showed its
determination to reintegrate with the international community. 132
Strains in the DOS rose especially on the topic of where Milošević should be
tried in court. Koštunica believed that Milošević should be brought to trial in
Belgrade before domestic courts to bring back legitimacy and trust to the judiciary
system. He supported cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but wanted to limit this cooperation. Đinđić on the other
hand believed Milošević should not serve his sentence in Serbia even if he was tried
in the country. They should let the Hague take him; they are strong and Serbia is
weak and therefore must agree to the Hague’s terms if Serbia is to survive and
prosper. 133 Another issue that the elites disagreed on is what to do with the future of
the Yugoslav Federation. Koštunica and Đinđić both agreed that comprehensive
reevaluation is needed for the constitutional relationship between Serbia, Kosovo,
Montenegro, and Vojvodina, but did not agree with what the reevaluation would hold.
Yugoslavia held their first democratic elections in 2000. However, Serbia
was not an independent country and must therefore continue progressing to be
considered its own democracy.
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Democratic Growth (2001-2010)
In June 2001, Đinđić overruled the Constitutional Court in Belgrade and
authorized to send Milošević to the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. Political tension
opened up because Koštunica still did not agree with Đinđić’s decision. Two months
later, Koštunica’s DSS pulled out of the Serbian government as the split with Đinđić
deepened. 134 In November and February a new assembly of the province and a new
president were elected, respectively.
Milošević was tried in the Hague on charges of genocide and war crimes in
February 2002. In March, heads of federal and republican governments signed the
Belgrade Agreement setting forth the parameters for a redefinition of Montenegro’s
relationship with Serbia. 135 The same month, Serbian authorities issued arrest
warrants for Serbian President Milan Milutinović and three other top Milošević aides,
including former Interior Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic. In the spring of 2002, the
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) announced its plan to send back
ethnic Serbs internally displaced persons to Serbia.
By the middle of 2002, Koštunica and Đinđić were openly at odds.
Koštunica’s party had withdrawn from all DOS decision-making bodies and was
trying to get early elections to the Serbian Parliament in an effort to force Đinđić out
of office. Political stalemate continued until the end of 2002 and reform initiatives
stalled. In June, all 45 deputies belonging to the DSS walked out of Serbian
Parliament in continuing rift with Đinđić. 136 As the year continued, two rounds of
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voting for the republic presidency failed because of insufficient voter turnout, since
Serbian law requires at least 50 percent participation of registered voters. 137
Đinđić was openly cooperating with the Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and began arresting people indicted for war crimes who sought refuge in
the country. 138 In January 2003, Milan Milutinović, the former Serbian President
from 1997 to 2002, surrendered to the Hague tribunal where he pleaded not guilty to
charges of crimes against humanity. 139
Serbian and Montenegro decided to create a looser connection between the
two states and formed the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in January 2003. One
month later, the Yugoslav parliament approved the Constitutional Charter for the
Union. The new charter devolved most federal functions and authorities to the
republic level. The office of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
held by Koštunica, ceased to exist once Svetozar Marović was elected President of
Serbia and Montenegro. The charter intended to stabilize the region and also stated
that in three years the two republics could hold referendums to decide whether or not
to keep the Union. 140
On March 12, 2003, the Serbian Prime Minister Đinđić was assassinated in
Belgrade because of his anti-crime measures. The newly formed union government
acted swiftly and called a state of emergency. They cracked down on organized
crime leading to the arrest of more than 4,000 people. The assassination of Đinđić
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showed dangerous divides within and between Serbia’s ruling political and security
elites. 141
Zoran Živković, Vice President of Đinđić’s DS party, was elected Prime
Minister in 2003 but government scandals led to an early election to replace him. 142
The November presidential elections for the Republic of Serbia were invalid because
of lack of voter turnout. 143 The inconclusive parliamentary elections in December
marked the start of prolonged coalition talks because it was unacceptable to not get
enough voters for every election. Serbia had been in a state of political crisis since
the overthrow of Milošević. The reformers had been unable to gain control of the
Serbian presidency because three successive presidential elections had failed to
produce the fifty percent required turnout. Đinđić’s assassination was yet another
major setback.
The parliamentary elections held on December 28 resulted in the pro-reform
coalition of four parties winning 49.8 percent of the vote and 146 parliamentary seats.
The coalition included the Democratic Party of Serbia led by Koštunica, the
Democratic Party, the G17 Plus group of liberal economics led by Miroljub Labus,
and the Serbian Renewal Movement/New Serbia (SPO-NS). They also had support
from the Socialist Party of Serbia. Koštunica, the former Yugoslavian President, was
named Prime Minister. 144
In March 2004 war crime trials open in Belgrade and six Serbs appeared in
court charged with killing two hundred civilians in the Croatian town of Vukovar in
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1991. 145 In June, the Democratic Party leader Boris Tadić was elected Serbian
president. He defeated nationalist Tomislav Nikolić and Tadić pledged that he will
steer Serbia towards joining the European Union. 146 Tadić’s election improved
Serbia’s political and international prospects and was the first presidential election for
several years that was considered legitimate. Also, the election law was changed so a
valid election could have less than fifty percent turnout rate.147
Starting in February 2005, Montenegro suggested that the Union of Serbia and
Montenegro end early. 148 Koštunica rejected this idea and continued supporting the
three-year wait period before referendums are called. During the year, eight former
secret police officers were jailed for murder of Serbia’s former president Ivan
Stambolić in 2000, who was president from 1985-1987. 149 After several months,
Koštunica agreed to begin to discuss a Stabilization and Association Agreement with
the EU. However, this agreement was called off because Serbia failed to arrest
several war crimes suspects. 150
In 2006 several important events occurred. First, Milošević was found dead in
his cell in the Hague. Secondly, on May 21, Montenegro voted for full independence
in their referendum with 55.4 percent supporting the initiative. 151 On June 3,
Montenegro declared independence through a peaceful separation. Two days later,
Serbia declared independence. This was the first time Serbia had been an
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independent state under its own name since 1918. Serbia kept the Serbia and
Montenegro Union’s memberships in all international organizations and bodies.
A referendum was held in October about a proposed draft of the new
constitution of Serbia. The majority of the electorate, approximately 3.4 million
people, voted to accept the country’s first new constitution since the days of
Milošević. Also, the constitution declared that Kosovo was an integral part of the
country. Kosovo’s Albanian majority boycotted the ballots, but, “in a rare share of
unity, all the main political parties had backed the draft constitution.” 152 However,
since barely more than fifty percent of the Serbian electorate took part in this
constitutional referendum, it showed that there is still indifference, disillusionment,
and elite division, which persistently troubled political life. Nonetheless, this was a
significant turning point in modern Serbian history.
In the January 2007 elections, Boris Tadić’s party doubled its representation
in parliament and confirmed the pro-reform and pro-European stance of parliament.
This was the first parliamentary election since the break up of the union with
Montenegro. The ultra-nationalist Radical Party did receive some support on the
ballots but still did not win enough seats to form a government. 153 This showed that
Serbia could handle being a democracy on its own without Yugoslavia or
Montenegro. In the May 2007 elections, the government formed a coalition with the
DS, DSS, and G17 Plus. Koštunica was chosen to continue as Prime Minister. 154
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Also in May, twelve people, including commanders of a special police unit, were
found guilty of Đinđić’s murder. 155
At the beginning of 2008, there was a run-off presidential election in which
Tadić defeated Radical Party candidate Nikolić and was re-elected President of
Serbia. Only a few days later, there was a unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s
independence resulting in weeks of crisis. The United States officially recognized
Kosovo’s independence the next day, followed by seventy-nine other nations. Serbia,
however, continued to reject Kosovo’s independence. 156 The governing coalition
collapsed in the wake of Kosovo’s independence in March. Prime Minister
Koštunica of the DSS demanded the DS, which held governmental majority, to
restructure the government contract including the annex according to which Serbia
can continue European integration exclusively with Kosovo as its integral part. The
DS and G17+ parties refused. Koštunica was forced to resign on March 8, 2008 and
he asked Tadić to call early parliamentary elections.
The pre-term parliamentary elections were held on May 11, 2008. The
Democratic Party coalition, with the message “for a European Serbia”, won 39
percent of the vote and 102 seats in Parliament. The coalition included the DS, G17+,
SPO, LSV, and SDP parties. They were also allies with the SPS-led block, the
Hungarian coalition, and the Bosniak List for European Sandzak. The Radical Party
(SRS) had 29.1 percent of votes, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) 11.3 percent,
Socialist Party (SPS) 7.9 percent, and the Liberal Democratic Party, Hungarian Party,
Bosniak List for European Sandzak Coalition, and Albanian Coalition each came
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under 6 percent. This election was the first time since 2000 that a single party, in this
case the DS, controlled the presidency, the premiership, and a working majority in
parliament. 157 Both the presidential and parliamentary elections were deemed fair
and free.
In July 2008, Mirko Cvetković was sworn in as the new Prime Minister and
led the coalition government bringing together the pro-EU Democratic Party and the
nationalist Socialist Party. Also in July, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić
was arrested in Belgrade by Serbian security forces. However, Serbia would not be
able to join the EU until two war crimes suspects are captured, including the former
Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladić. In September, Radical Party deputy
president and two-time presidential candidate Tomislav Nikolić split from the SRS
and formed the Forward Serbia caucus, or Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). 158
The government in 2009 passed many important laws including a statute that
defined and expanded Vojvodina’s autonomy, legislation to improve conditions for
NGO’s, and to improve relations with the US and EU. 159 Other improvements were
in civil society, local governance, and national democratic governance. Parliament
passed the Antidiscrimination Law, the Law on Associations, the Law on Transfer of
Jurisdiction from National Municipal government, and the Law on Financing of
Political Organizations. 160 In December, SNS won a victory over the DS in a
Belgrade municipality showing the party’s consolidation.
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By looking at Freedom House’s studies, Serbia’s electoral framework is still
weak and behind European standards; its electoral process is a 3.25 out of 7.
However, in 2010 it lowered both its political rights and civil rights levels to a 2. 161
Serbia has been considered an electoral democracy since its independence in 2006
and has been working towards consolidating its democracy ever since. Presently,
NGO’s, human rights defenders, and citizens have more favorable conditions to work
in since the Law on Association and the Antidiscrimination laws were passed. 162
Trade unions are still marginalized but the workers’ movement is gaining momentum
in its demands for decentralization and the fight against corruption. Kosovo still
presents a potential region of instability for Serbia and other Balkan states.

Conclusion
The democratic transition time period of Serbia is under dispute, specifically
concerning when it started its transition and when it officially became a democracy.
It is widely accepted that Serbia is undeniably an electoral democracy in 2010 by
states and well-known non-governmental organizations worldwide, like Freedom
House. However, when did it begin its transition? When did it have its first free
democratic election? How did elites and social movements play a role in this
transition?
Transition Period
As defined by Francisco Gonzalez and Desmond King, a democracy is a
government that has free and fair participation and contestation, and a wide protection
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of civil rights. 163 A country can be labeled a democracy without possessing high
levels of political participation, personal autonomy, or other democratic
characteristics. Freedom House labels some countries as only “partly free”, as
opposed to “free”, while still calling them democracies, for example Yugoslavia was
labeled partly free and an electoral democracy in 2002. 164 During the phase of
consolidation, a country can progress to be more free and get a better rating on the
protection of political rights and civil liberties. The consolidation of a democracy is
the process of adaptation of democratic structures and norms. 165
As I previously mentioned, it is accepted that Serbia is a democracy now and
that it is working to consolidate its practices. However, when did Serbia officially
become a democracy? By working backwards, the democratic transition time period
will be determined by first finding when it became a democracy and then when the
transition started.
A democratic transition period is from the breakdown of the dictatorship to its
first democratic national election. The first democratic national election that was held
in Serbia was actually when Serbia was still part of Yugoslavia in 2000. When the
Yugoslav Presidency was up for reelection, Koštunica ended up winning the majority
of votes ousting Milošević from power. Even though Milošević first refused to
accept this result, after mass demonstrations and the storming of government
buildings, he renounced his title. Newspapers and NGO’s all over the globe were
163
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congratulating Serbia on its impressive performance of the popular support pushing
the country to a democracy. 166 However, Serbia was still a member of Yugoslavia,
and the election was not for Serbian representatives. Therefore, it can be argued that
Yugoslavia became a democracy in 2000, but Serbia did not.
In 2006, when Serbia became an independent country after both Montenegro
and Serbia seceded from the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia had its first
presidential and parliamentary elections. Even though Serbia technically had
democratic elections previous to this date, it was not an independent country and
therefore could not be considered a democracy. Therefore, Serbia became a
democracy in 2006 after it gained its independence.
The next question is when did the transition begin? According to definition,
the beginning of a transition is at the breakdown of dictatorship. For Yugoslavia,
Milošević lost power and Yugoslavia had their first democratic election at the same
election. Also, it is apparent from the chronology that there had been vital elite
negotiations and social movements moving the country towards democracy before the
dictator was removed. The beginning of the transition could be argued to be when the
first major social movement occurred showing discontent with the present ruler in
1992 at the University of Belgrade. It could also be argued to begin with the first
major elite negotiations in 1996 with the formation of the “Together Coalition.”
Furthermore, the transition could simply be between the 2000 election day and when
Milošević was officially ousted as President of Yugoslavia. However, this last
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possibility is difficult to argue because this took place in one month, and it actually
reverses the definition order of a transition, having the election take place first and the
removal of the dictator afterwards. I believe that the beginning and end of
Yugoslavia’s transition is the 2000 election. The numerous events that could be
signified as the beginning and end of Yugoslavia’s transition are displayed in the
table below.
Year
1992

1996

2000

2000

Part of Transition
Event
Beginning
The large student protest “Enough” at the
University of Belgrade that lasted several weeks.
Faculty, local businesses, and other citizens joined
the protest and supported it in other ways by
providing food and electronic equipment. This is
the first major social movement against the dictator
Milošević.
Beginning
The beginning of the Prudent Revolution by the
formation of the Zajedno “Together” Coalition.
This was the first major elite negotiation under
Milošević that proved to be partly successful by
winning the 1996 municipal elections. It showed
that the opposition political elites understood that
they must work together to overthrow Milošević.
Beginning
The 2000 election ousted Milošević from the
Yugoslav Presidency. When Milošević didn’t
recognize Koštunica’s win, there was a massive
protest that forced Milošević to resign.
End
The 2000 election were the first democratic national
election for Yugoslavian President. Koštunica won
the election as representative of the DOS coalition.

In Serbia’s case, the beginning of the transition could be argued to be one of
the above choices for Yugoslavia, especially when Milošević was overthrown.
Another option for the beginning of the transition is when Milošević was arrested in
2001 demonstrating the true end to any interference from their past dictator. Until he
was arrested, he could still have reentered politics or caused further social damage in
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Serbia hindering its democratic efforts. I would argue that the beginning of the
transition is when Milošević was actually overthrown in 2000 because even though he
could have politically acted until his arrest a year later, he did not. The overthrow of
Milošević truly signified the turning point for Serbia and Yugoslavia alike. From this
point forward, Serbia’s transition will be described as from the fall of Milošević in
2000 to 2006 when Serbia gained independence. The events of Serbia’s democratic
transition are described in the table below.
Year
2000

2001

2006

Part of Transition
Event
Beginning
The 2000 election ousted Milošević from the
Yugoslav Presidency. When Milošević didn’t
recognize Koštunica’s win, there was a massive
protest that forced Milošević to resign. The dictator
was overthrown.
Beginning
April 1, 2001 Milošević was arrested and charged
with misuse of state funds and abuse of office. By
getting rid of Milošević, Serbia showed its
determination to reintegrate with the international
community. Milošević can no longer make any
impact on Serbian politics.
End
Serbia and Montenegro split and became their own
independent countries. Serbia had its first
democratic presidential and parliamentary elections.

Other people may argue that Serbia has not been able to become a democracy
yet and is still in transition. It is very difficult in this scenario to tell if Serbia is
transitioning or consolidating. However, it very widely accepted that Serbia is a
democracy and is in its democratic consolidation phase currently.
One author argues that post-communist countries as a group had interesting
democratic transitions because of their specific and similar histories of communism.
Most, if not all, or post-communist countries had electoral revolutions. Also, since
the military was not politicized, electoral outcomes determined political outcomes.
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For example, when liberal opposition won an election, democratization directly
followed. The elections during the communist period actually helped the population
develop a clear distinction in the public mind between “us” and “them”. The
population in post-communist countries were also very well educated having up to 10
years of schooling, unlike in Sub-Saharan Africa where the average is three years,
leading to more support in opposition groups. Also, international donors like the US
and EU focused on post-communist countries with helpful investments in civil
society, opposition groups, and the media to enable a faster transition. 167
Now that the transition has been determined and analyzed, the theoretical
question of the role that elites and masses play will now be discussed in the context of
Serbia’s democratic transition. It is important to clarify that Serbia’s transition, not
Yugoslavia’s, will be discussed in relation to the role of elites and social movements.
However, since Serbia was a part of Yugoslavia and the Union of Serbia and
Montenegro, many of its historical events are intertwined with Yugoslavia’s.

Elites
The political elites played a significant role in the democratic transition of
Serbia in the early twenty-first century. The opposition elites, including Drašković,
Đinđić, and Koštunica began negotiating many years before the transition started.
They formed many coalitions, some lasting, others falling short of making an impact
like the Zajedno coalition in 1996. However, the opposition began to strengthen over
the next few years. Đinđić and Koštunica led the Prudent Revolution and Drašković
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supported the opposition campaign as well. In 2000 the DOS led a coalition of
eighteen parties to the polls for Yugoslavian presidency. Koštunica and Đinđić were
working side-by-side, despite their many disagreements, to overthrow Milošević.
After Milošević’s defeat on October 5, 2000, Koštunica became Yugoslav’s president
and Đinđić became the Prime Minister of Serbia. However, these two leading men
began to disagree more and more over the next few months. By 2002, they were
openly at odds and trying to force each other out of their respective offices. For many
elections after the overthrow of Milošević, the population had difficulty bringing
enough people to the polls. However, after Đinđić was assassinated, Koštunica was
able to work openly with the Democratic Party, the G17+ party, the Serbian Renewal
Movement, and the Socialist Party of Serbia. Serbia progressed further once Tadić
was elected president in a fair, valid, and democratic election. Serbia was well on its
way to becoming its present independent democracy after 2006.
However, do these actions fit into the clean-cut categories proscribed by
Higley and Burton? Higley and Burton argue that first elites must become consensual
through either elite settlement or general elite convergence, to have a chance at
successful democratization. In order for a group to be considered consensual elites,
they must make an effort to agree on the rules of the political game while still holding
different ideas and values. Once Milošević was taken out of power and into custody,
it was possible for political rules to be agreed upon universally by the other elites.
However, the agreement was only between pro-reform elites. People were too angry
towards Milošević and his party to consider allowing them into the new government
for several years, but eventually the SPS did become an ally to the ruling democratic
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coalition. Therefore, the elites in Serbia did become a consensual elite since they
openly disagreed with each other about issues like where Milošević should have his
trial, but they acted under democratic rules.
The next question is whether they became consensual through an elite
settlement or a general elite convergence? There was not a single document or event
that brought all elites together. First, the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party
of Serbia worked together through Đinđić and Koštunica. Then more and more
parties joined their coalition to form the 18-party Democratic Opposition of Serbia
coalition for the 2000 elections. Once this coalition died due to growing arguments
between Đinđić and Koštunica, new coalitions had to form resulting in the newest
group including G17+, the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and others. It
appears that since the 2000 elections, the elites have been working under democratic
rules, despite personal disagreements. Therefore, Serbia might best fit under the title
of general elite convergence since the opposition parties demonstrated their ability to
work together first at the 2000 election and the Socialist and Nationalist parties joined
later after several presidential and parliamentary elections because it was clear that
they would no longer gain sole power. It is difficult to assign Serbia to a specific
category, however, because it is unclear exactly how Serbia’s elites began to
negotiate and resulted in a democracy. The events are all recent making it more
difficult to gather all the relevant information at hand.

101

Masses
In opposition to Higley and Burton’s belief that elites are the only drivers in
national outcomes, Serbia’s history has demonstrated that the masses have a major
influence as well. As described by Doug Bandow, “democracy has come to
Yugoslavia through the efforts of the Serb populace, not those of Western
policymakers. The next American president should recognize the obvious limits of
U.S. influence.” 168 The Serb peoples came out on several occasions to voice their
frustration and anger towards Milošević in rallies and demonstrations. Finally
culminating in the hundreds of thousands of citizens gathering in Belgrade in 2000
and forcing Milošević to resign by storming the government buildings on foot and
bulldozer. Progress must be made by the native populations, not by international
force or influence.
Similar to South Africa though, the social movements were the most massive
and influential when the dictator was still in power, before the official democratic
transition began. The social movements demonstrated that the people were not happy
and that the government must focus on the citizens desires in order to gain public
support. Especially in post-communist states, the people felt a strong connection to
other opposition supporters; there was a mutual feeling of “us” against “them”. Once
the dictator was overthrown, they did not feel that they must show their support or
discontent through mass protests on the streets. Instead, they took to the polls.
Đinđić saw voting, not street demonstrations, as the best way to unseat Milošević and
therefore believed that the main goal should be to go to the polls united and defeat the
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ruling coalition. 169 This attitude continued after Milošević’s resignation, making
coalitions very important in Serbia in the new millennium. For many elections after
the overthrow of Milošević, the population had difficulty bringing enough people to
the polls; this is also a form of political action because the people did not support
someone enough to compel them to vote. Serbs take politics seriously and will vote
or act based on their personal values and motivations.
In Serbia it is made clear that both elite negotiations and social movements
play an integral part in democratization. However, social movements were mostly
used during the dictatorship to show the attitudes of the masses, and through voting
once democratic principles were adopted. The movements led the country to the
democratic path and enforced the beginning of the transition. It was then up to the
elites to make sure the country stayed on the democratic path and worked toward EU
membership and better relations with the US.
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Chapter 4
Democratization of Haiti
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Introduction
Haiti has struggled to be independent and democratic since its colonization by
the French in 1697. First, Haiti gained its independence in 1804 but has since been
governed by dictators and had foreign involvement negatively impacting Haiti’s
transition to democracy. Many argue that Haiti has never become a democracy and is
still working towards that goal presently. Others believe that after dictator JeanClaude Duvalier was ousted in 1986 the democratic transition began. The military
took control over the government until, by popular demand, a democratic election
took place in 1990. Unfortunately, the elites were not consolidated and international
actors had alternative plans for Haiti, so the democracy failed to consolidate under
Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Haiti’s second democratic transition began when Aristide was
overthrown in 2004 and ended when René Préval was democratically elected in 2006.
As a case study in this thesis, Haiti provides an interesting example for
democratic transitions. In the past twenty years, Haiti has had two transitions, one
that is still being consolidated presently. This allows me to have two modern case
studies to research within one country. Also, since Haiti failed in its first democratic
consolidation, I am able to examine what factors of the transition helped or hindered
its democratic experiment and what Haiti can do during its second democratic attempt
to make it successful.
In this chapter, I will cover Haiti’s history from its colonization in 1697 to its
present situation in 2011, focusing on the Duvalier and Aristide regimes and the
democratic transitions that occurred in their wakes. Even though Haiti’s democracies
are being, and have been, tested during its consolidation phase, I focus on the actual

105

transition phase and what allowed it to succeed or fail as time passed. By looking at
social movements that erupted by the people and negotiations between the Haitian
elites, it can be investigated whether one or the other had a more prominent impact on
the success of Haiti’s democratic transitions.
Haiti follows the Most Different Systems Design with Similar Outcomes with
South Africa and Serbia. The qualifications for the model in this analysis is that each
case study has a different history, culture, economy, and social aspects but still is
successful in their transition experience. Therefore, since Haiti has a very different
background than the other two case studies, involving colonization, a poor economy,
lack elite populations, and extremely active foreign involvement, it fits the MDD
system. Also, Haiti has had successful democratic transitions twice in the last twenty
years, even though it failed to maintain it in the 1990s and is still working to
consolidate its most recent democratic government from 2006. Haiti fits the design
used in the thesis very well and provides more than one transition to study making it a
more useful case study to determine the positive and negative effects that elite
negotiations and social movements have on the success of a democratic transition.

History of Haiti
Haitian Colonization, Independence, and Dictatorship (1697-1957)
By starting with the colonization of Haiti in 1697, the international and
domestic relationships with France and French-speaking Haitians can be clarified. In
1697, the Treaty of Rustic divided the island of Hispaniola between the French and
Spanish. The French got the western third and named it Saint Domingue. French
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colonists arrived, established plantations, and Saint Domingue became the richest
French colony in the new world because of their sugar, coffee, and indigo exports.
Slaves were brought from Africa and they were treated brutally; one-third of newly
imported Africans died within a few years.
Slavery and agricultural dominance continued in Saint Domingue for a
century. In 1791 there was a turn of events when a slave revolution, led by Toussaint
Louverture, exploded in the northern plains and spread to the rest of the colony. A
year later, the French government tried to reestablish control by beginning to build an
alliance with free blacks in search for additional civil rights. In 1793, slavery was
abolished in Saint Domingue. A few years later in 1801, Toussaint Louverture, the
former slave made guerrilla leader, conquered Haiti and proclaimed himself
governor-general of an autonomous government over all Hispaniola. He helped Saint
Domingue achieve peace and drove out the Spaniards and English. However, the
French were not happy with Louverture’s action and imprisoned him. After his
imprisonment, slavery was reestablished by the French in Saint Domingue. In 1802,
the French led by Napoleon’s brother-in-law Charles Leclerc attempted to conquer
the colony’s interior but failed.
Finally, in 1804, Saint Domingue became independent. Jean-Jacques
Dessalines defeated the French at the Battle of Vertieres for emancipation and
independence and declared himself emperor. The nation was called Ayiti, or Haiti,
and was the only nation to be born from a slave revolt. However, independence did
not come without a heavy price; Haiti had to pay France for its own independence
hurting its economy drastically for years to come.
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However, independence did not mean peace and calm for Haiti. Dessalines
was assassinated in 1806 and Haiti was divided into a black-controlled north and a
mulatto-ruled south. 170 In 1818, President Jean-Pierre Boyer reunified the two parts
of Haiti and ruled until 1843 when he was ousted after losing elite support.
Time passes and in 1915, the United States invaded Haiti in response to blackmulatto friction. The disturbance began in March when General Vilbrun Guillaume
Sam took the oath of office. On July 27, he executed 167 political prisoners. Popular
outrage provoked mob violence in the streets of Port-au-Prince and angry citizens
found Guillaume Sam at the French Embassy, tore him to pieces, and paraded his
body around the city. This disturbed the US and spurred them to swift action. 171 The
US thought that this uneasiness endangered its property and investments in the
country. The US occupied Haiti on July 28 and within six weeks US representatives
controlled Haitian customs houses and administrative institutions. Admiral William
Caperton declared martial law in 1915 that lasted until 1929. This is one of the
United States’ first involvements with Haiti based on US objectives.
During its military rule, the US dismantled the constitutional system and
reinstituted virtual slavery to build infrastructure, including road and bridge building,
disease control, school establishment, and a communications system. 172
Approximately 3,000 Haitians were killed during this period of infrastructure
building. From 1915 to 1934 the US military controlled most of the Haitian
government. United States representatives had veto power over all governmental
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decisions and the marine corps commanders served as administrators in the provinces.
Haitians only had control over local institutions. Having the US military occupy
Haiti led to protests and several episodes in which Haitians were killed by US army
soldiers or marines.
Occupation had several effects on Haiti, both positive and negative.
Constructively, occupation greatly improved infrastructure and public health in the
country. Negatively, violence erupted and society dwindled. In 1918 there was a
rebellion of up to 40,000 citizens and 2,000 Haitians died. 173 Order was imposed by
white, racist foreigners, and the marines established Jim Crow standards. Whites did
not recognize mulatto elites as superior to blacks, which is how society had been set
up for decades. Also, this intolerance led to racial pride and further segregation
between the blacks, whites, and mulattos.
When the US marines left, they left Haiti in control of the military Garde
d’Haiti, therefore still maintaining fiscal control until 1947. These national guards
ran the country by violence and terror after the US left. In 1941 Elie Lescot became
president but was ousted by a coup in 1950 when he tried to change the constitution
to allow his reelection. General Paul Magloire led the coup and ruled until 1956
when he himself was forced out by general strike and another military coup. Voodoo
physician François Duvalier, later known as Papa Doc, seized power in the military
coup with US support and legitimated his power in an election a year later.
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Duvalier’s Reign (1957-1984)
The presidential elections held in 1957 reconfirmed François Duvalier’s
power in Haiti. The elections were difficult to organize but the military junta finally
took responsibility to regulate them. Elections were set for September 22 and in the
ten months before the election many presidential candidates came forward, including
François Duvalier, Louis Dejoie, and Daniel Fignolé. Duvalier was the former
minister of health and labor and had massive support among the blacks. He was a
strong believer in the rights of the Haitian black majority and his goal was to advance
black interests in the public sector. Their campaigns were bitterly fought and by the
time of the election there were only two effective candidates left, Duvalier and
Dejoie. 174 Duvalier’s campaign speeches stressed the need for economic equality and
for improved conditions of the exploited masses. Duvalier also guaranteed freedom
and protection to trade unions. 175
The election resulted in Duvalier receiving 697,884 votes, Dejoie had 266,992
votes, and Jumelle had 9,980 votes. All senate seats went to supporters of Duvalier
because Dejoie was unable to get a majority vote in any department. 176 On October
22 Duvalier was inaugurated as Haitian President.
Duvalier worked towards a ‘new equilibrium’ in the country. There was a
major shift in power from the established, predominantly mulatto elite to a new black
middle class, who was to act in the interests of the mass of peasants and workers from
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which its members had emerged. 177 However, Duvalier did not necessarily have the
interests of Haiti in mind despite his campaign promises and goals. First, in 1964
Duvalier declared himself president-for life and established a dictatorship with the
help of his newly formed Tonton Macoutes militia. The Tonton Macoutes was an
organ of repression and was also a means of recruiting support throughout the
country. 178 Duvalier turned them into his personal paramilitary force that functioned
to counterbalance the regular armed forces and whose members infiltrated and spied
upon the military. By infiltrating the armed forces and purging officer corps,
Duvalier minimized the Haitian military capacity for autonomous action during his
rule and ensured he would not be overthrown by a coup. 179
After forming his personal militia, he worked towards securing his power by
eliminating any opposition and restricting army officers, Roman Catholic hierarchy,
the US embassy, and trade union leadership. First, he concentrated seven years of his
term on eliminating potential opposition. His electoral competition from the 1957
election was eliminated; Dejoie was forced into exile and the Jumelle brothers went
into hiding. 180 Other opponents were powerful members of the business community
in Port-au-Prince. However, Duvalier made strikes ineffective because of the ruthless
action by the Macoutes in forcing open the doors of closed businesses, thus leaving
them to be looted. 181 In addition, by creating a support network of the black rural
middle class, he restricted growth of moderate opposition because it is usually the
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middle class that would support such opposition. He gained their support by
penetrating civil society and using his personal paramilitary organization. 182
To further stabilize his regime, he restricted army officers and eliminated
church involvement. He believed the church was a center of opposition to his regime
and therefore had a constant feud with the Roman Catholic hierarchy from 19591966. 183 Also, Papa Doc worked to restrict the US embassy and other foreign
involvement. Foreign aid was cut off to Haiti making his actions independent of
foreign pressures for political reform. 184 Furthermore, the US was not opposed to
Duvalier because he appeared to be willing to cooperate with American interests in
the country and to support US police in the international field. 185
Lastly, to ensure there could be no mass opposition, Duvalier restricted trade
union leadership. Union participation was low anyway, but grew less appealing over
the years. In November 1960, the Union Intersyndicale d’Haiti (UIH) joined in
support of a student strike and protested against the arrest of student leaders, but with
little effect. Many leading unionists were arrested, others went into exile. The UIH
and the Federation Haitienne des Syndicats Chrétiens (FHSC) continued to exist as
independent bodies and a number of successful strikes were organized by their
constituent unions. However, in December 1963, the UIH was dissolved by the
government and its leaders were arrested. A few weeks later, the FHSC was also
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dissolved. After this time, only unions who supported the government were
allowed. 186
Since Duvalier worked so hard to consolidate his power, there were no
opportunities for the masses during his rule to protest or show discontent. However,
unlike some people believe, Duvalier was not a fascist or totalitarian. He did not
impose upon the country a total ideology and did not dominate the whole life of the
average citizen. However, it was by no doubt that his rule was ruthless and
dictatorial. 187 Duvalier had iron rule during his presidential term. He gave the mass
of peasants the sense that they were important citizens by calling peasants from
remote villages to see and talk to him in the palace. He remained in power for so
long because of his “ruthless suppression of opposition groups… his shrewd
knowledge of the mentality and customs of the Haitian peasants, and his recognition
of the key role played by the middle class…” 188 There was little to no opposition to
his regime among the masses. The only opposition that remained was the lightskinned elite, but they were prepared to compromise after they became convinced
they could not overthrow the government. 189
When François Duvalier died in 1971, Jean-Claude Duvalier took over from
his father at nineteen years old. François had named him his successor as presidentfor-life and the transition was smooth and successful. 190 Almost immediately, JeanClaude, or commonly known as Baby Doc, began unraveling all the hard work his
father accomplished to secure their power. After marrying into a mulatto family, he
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excluded the black elites from his patronage circle and favored the mulatto
commercial elites. 191 The black elites had originally been the core of the regime’s
support during his father’s regime. The middle class patronage network from Papa
Doc unraveled making it difficult for Baby Doc to penetrate and control society.
However, the opposition did not come from the newly excluded black elite.
All of their leaders had been killed or exiled so they lacked the necessary leadership
and organization. 192 There were no viable revolutionary or moderate opposition
organizations in existence that could take advantage of the government’s weaknesses
and create a broad coalition against Baby Doc.
Another result of shifting his support to the mulatto elite was that Duvalier
had to increase his dependence on foreign aid allowing the US to have more influence
over Haitian activities. Once a country is dependent on aid from other countries,
there are many more positions and opinions that must be taken into consideration
before actions can be made. Baby Doc experienced this international influence and it
was what ultimately threw him out of power several years down the road.
As stated before, the opposition did not come from the black elites, but rather
the military. The weakness of civilian groups cleared the way for military’s seizure
of power in 1986. A group of army officers disliked Baby Doc from the beginning of
his rule. Chief-of-staff Henri Namphy began a military opposition by recruiting
support in the ranks of former officers dismissed by Duvalier. Segments of armed
forces regained capacity to act autonomously against the present dictator when they
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couldn’t against Papa Doc. 193 The US helped military conspirators by promising
concessions to those who helped get rid of Duvalier. General Namphy then used
these US concessions to persuade Macoutes leadership to abandon Duvalier. 194
Jean-Claude Duvalier, himself, brought about the destruction of the
dictatorship his father worked so hard to instill. He not only alienated the black elite
and increased dependence on US aid, he also loosened his grip on the military. The
Roman Catholic Church gained more power during the economic crisis and led many
popular uprisings between 1984-1986. Duvalier couldn’t contain the unrest because
of his lack of control over society. Furthermore, the US used its leverage to push
Duvalier out of office and helped the military gain control. The US had been secretly
negotiating with the military and on January 29, 1986 the US announced withholding
$26 million of aid to protest Duvalier’s brutal response to the popular protests over
the past two years. 195

1st Transition (1986-1990)
The first successful democratic transition in Haiti was from 1986 to 1990.
On February 6, 1986 Jean-Claude Duvalier was ousted after protests and was exiled
to France. He was taken from Haiti on a US Air Force C-141 and the US was able to
find and support an acceptable replacement for Duvalier, Lieutenant-General Henri
Namphy. Unlike the peaceful transition from father to son rule in 1971, this was a
violent transition of neopatrimonial rule to military rule. During Baby Doc’s term,
there was an increase in military autonomy and withdrawal of elite support for
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Duvalier enabling the military to use this autonomy to turn against Duvalier and fill
the political gap. 196 Without moderate and revolutionary political organizations or
the Macoutes, the military was able to seize state power unchallenged. The US
helped solidify the armed force’s control by sending arms and aid. 197
After Duvalier, a series of military coups reshuffled the government several
times before the 1990 elections. Not only were military coups prevalent, many
massacres also occurred during this transition phase. From July 1 to 3 in 1987, army
soldiers killed twenty-two workers on strike in the harbor of Port-au-Prince. The
strikers were part of a broader movement for democracy. 198 Also, the three hour long
St. Jean Bosco massacre took place at one of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s parishes.
These massacres showed that the Haitian people were still greatly oppressed, despite
getting rid of Duvalier, but were unable to successfully rise up against those in power.
Social movements and protests were not used very widely and were brutally
suppressed by the armed forces.
In March 1987 a new constitution was created and received overwhelming
support by Haiti’s population. This constitution was formed because of international
pressure and was therefore structured like the French constitution. It recognized a
president to be elected for five years, an elected parliament composed of a 27member senate and an 83-member house of representatives, and a presidential
appointed prime minister. 199 General elections were planned for November 1987 but
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were aborted after dozens of inhabitants were shot in the capital by soldiers and
Tonton Macoutes members and scores of people were massacred around the country.
In a second attempt, elections were held but were fraudulent and military-controlled.
They were boycotted by opposition candidates and the elected President Leslie
Manigat was overthrown only a few months later in the June 1988 Haitian coup d'état
when he sought to assert his constitutional control over the military. BrigadierGeneral Prosper Avril, who had led the coup, installed a civilian government under
military control and led the regime until March 1990. In 1990, the civilian and
military elite facing considering foreign pressure and anxious to end the country’s
isolation in a growing democratic world, finally decided to tolerate fair elections. 200

Aristide’s First Term with Military Interruption (1990-1995)
On December 16, 1990, more than three million peasants and workers came
out to vote for Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former populist priest. 201 International
observers regulated many polling booths to discourage violence or fraud. Even
though the vote counting was chaotic, the results were clearly in favor of Aristide.
He won more than 2/3 of the vote and his closest opponent polled less than thirteen
percent. 202 The day after the election, exultant voters flooded the streets dancing.
Abroad, Aristide’s election was seen as a major step forward for a country that had
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never known democracy. His popularity and legitimacy were undeniable and foreign
democracies had no choice but to welcome him. 203
Before Aristide even was inaugurated, he had to deal with coup attempts. In
January 1991, former Tonton Macoutes leader Roger Lafontant seized the interim
President Ertha Pascal-Trouillot and declared himself President. After Lafontant
attempted to declare martial law and large numbers of Aristide’s supporters filled the
streets in protest, the army crushed the incipient coup.
On February 7, Aristide began his five-year term of office. Immediately,
Aristide began working on substantial reforms, which brought passionate opposition
from Haiti’s business, military, and political elite. First, he turned over his monthly
salary to the government, disdained traditional politics, and attempted to run the
country based on popular, participatory support from the poor. He filled the 6.4
million poor citizens with a fire for justice and freedom. 204 However, Aristide’s ideas
were threatening to the privileged way of life that other parts of society had long
enjoyed. 205
Secondly, Aristide worked to cleanse the nation of the corrupt, oppressive
remnants of the Duvalier era through the moral movement called Lavalas. Targets
included former members of the Tonton Macoutes, other Duvalier supporters, and the
smuggling rackets operated by the army. 206 Government agencies were purged of
suspected Macoutes and administrative positions were filled with Lavalas
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militants. 207 He was also determined to force the exploitative rich to change their
ways.
Third, Aristide chose his friend René Préval as Prime Minister, which
deteriorated the president’s relationship with political elites. Aristide passed over
prominent rivals when filling the premiership and other posts. Marc Bazin from the
National Agriculture for Democracy and Progress party and Louis Dejoie from the
National Agriculture Industrial Party, who won second and third places respectively
in the election, were not appointed as prime minister or any other political role. Not
only did Aristide not use opposition leaders in his new government, he also didn’t use
legislators from his own electoral coalition. The National Front for Change and
Democracy party began to distrust Aristide and Aristide’s relations with parliament
became tense. In the end, Aristide chose his close friend René Préval to be prime
minister. Opponents soon accused the two of conspiring to control the legislature. 208
Aristide ruffled other feathers as well. At first, Aristide was on good terms
with the military, but then numerous officers were demoted and replaced and plans
were made for a new civilian police force. This brought resentment and fear among
the security forces and rumors began of a military coup. 209 Also, by raising minimum
wage in Haiti, Aristide made tensions grow with the US who wanted to keep wages
low for consumer purposes in the US. 210 The United States felt that a democracy in
Haiti was a threat and the US planned to undermine its democracy and independence.
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Aristide brought in formal elements of democracy, like parties, institutions,
and the separation of powers, but did not get rid of core politics of Duvalierism or
legacies of slavery that cultivated hatred and mistrust. In the end, opposition grew
too strong and on September 30, 1991 Aristide was overthrown in a coup d'état led by
Army General Raoul Cédras. On October 1, Raoul Cédras installed the military, or
“de-facto”, regime. 211 The Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the
coup and the United Nations set up a trade embargo. However, George Bush Sr.
announced that the US would violate the embargo by exempting US firms.
A campaign of terror against Aristide’s supporters was started by the brutal
Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and Emmanuel Constant,
a CIA asset. 212 Army soldiers, former Macoutes, and groups of armed men chased
and killed members and alleged members of the pro-democracy movement. More
than 1,000 poor blacks were murdered in the following weeks. 213 Within a few days,
the national legislature declared Aristide’s office vacant and named a new president
and prime minister, restoring real power to the army officers and wealthy mulatto
families that had previously controlled the country under Baby Doc. 214
After a few years, foreign powers began supporting Aristide again and
conspired on how to return him to power because he appeared to be a better option for
stability in Haiti than the present situation. Also, the majority of Haitians wanted
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Aristide back because he provided them with jobs and sent their children to school. 215
In 1993, the UN imposed sanctions after the military regime rejected an accord
facilitating Aristide’s return. Then a year later, an American team, under the
direction of the Clinton administration, successfully negotiated the departure of
Haiti’s military leaders and the peaceful entry of US forces under Operation Uphold
Democracy. This paved the way to restore Aristide as president. Clinton came up
with conditions Aristide must adopt if he returned, including the adoption of program
proposed by Marc Bazin, the defeated US candidate in the 1990 elections. 216 In
October, Aristide returned to Haiti to complete his term of office protected by US and
UN forces. 217
One of the first things Aristide and his Lavalas party did in office was to
disband the Haitian army and establish a civilian police force to take over internal
security functions. This police force, the Haitian National Police (PNH) was trained
by the US Justice Department but was a disappointment over the years because of
increased corruption in its ranks. 218 This shift in armed forces was made before the
June 1995 parliamentary elections. International observers questioned the legitimacy
of the June elections and Aristide’s supporters fell out among themselves. The
Lavalas movement remained firmly behind him, but Aristide’s previous supporters
from the 1990 election, including the FNCD, claimed fraud and boycotted the runoff
elections. In the end, Lavalas still won an overwhelming parliamentary majority. 219
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Préval in Power (1995-2000)
In December 1995, presidential elections were held. René Préval, who was
Aristide’s prime minister in 1991, was nominated as Lavalas’s presidential candidate.
With Aristide backing him, Préval won 88 percent of the popular vote, despite FNCD
and other major opposition parties boycotting the election.220 Aristide peacefully
handed over power to Préval who took office on February 7, 1996. The UN had
slowly replaced US troops with UN representatives over the past months but the UN
had planned to withdraw all of its troops by the end of the month. However, the PNH
clearly lacked the competence to fill the void, therefore, at Préval’s urging the UN
extended its stay with a decreased number of troops. 221
By September 1996, Préval continued with Aristide’s original goal of
dismissing all military and security forces. The two Lavalas party leaders believed
that abolishing the army was necessary because the military did not support
democratic attempts and encouraged military coups. Préval had purged much of his
security force because they had been involved in the murders a month earlier of two
politicians from the right wing Mobilization for National Development party. 222
However, by not having an army or police force, security problems grew rampantly in
the country.
Politics in 1997 became deadlocked, lasting until 1999. It began when the
April senatorial elections had irregularities and were not immediately solved. In
June, the current Prime Minister Rosny Smarth resigned because of growing criticism
of the government’s economic policies. The ongoing election dispute originated from
220
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April meant that parliament would not approve of the new prime minister to replace
Smarth. 223 In addition, Aristide announced an alliance with other congressional
groups to oppose Préval’s economic reform plans. 224 The political deadlock led to
dramatic political violence across Haiti. There was the murder of an opposition
senator, rising corruption, and the frequent indiscipline of new police force members.
The police force had been created from scratch in Haiti where there had been tenuous
civic traditions and where the sustainability of post-Cédras administration of justice
reform was doubtful. In 1999, Préval declared that parliament’s term has expired and
he began ruling by decree following a series of disagreements with deputies.
Hurricane Georges made social matters worse when 80 percent of the crops were
destroyed making hunger rise in Haiti. 225
The new millennium brought more parliamentary and presidential elections to
Haiti. The parliamentary elections were held in May and Aristide’s party won 26 of
the 27 Senate seats. Eight of these seats were disputed however because of electoral
fraud. These seats did not get majority vote so there should have been a run-off
election, but since Aristide claimed they had received enough votes to bypass a runoff election, it was declared that he “stole” the seats. Aristide lost his credibility
during these elections because of his manipulation attempts. The 2000 parliamentary
elections were used against Aristide in the subsequent presidential elections.
However, this allegation was not enough to persuade people against Aristide and
boycott the elections. Aristide won the presidential elections with an overwhelming
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92 percent of the vote. The US, Canada, and European Union refused to send
observers to the sham November elections, which may have had a negative effect on
the outcome. 226

Aristide’s Second Term (2000-2004)
Despite Aristide’s overwhelming support by the masses, opposition parties
worked to create an alternative government before Aristide was sworn in on February
7, 2001, but were unsuccessful. 227 Aristide had a dissolving country on his hands
when he was inaugurated as president. First, the infrastructure was not seen as
legitimate in Haiti. The judicial system was corrupt and dysfunctional, especially in
rural areas. There was also a large case backlog, an outdated legal code, and poor
facilities. Without a prominent police force and army to maintain control, mob
violence and armed gangs became security threats in urban areas. Increased drug
trade and local narcotics consumption was believed to contribute to violence. 228
Also, legal rights were not enforced. Unions were too weak to engage in collective
bargaining and organization was difficult because the unemployment rate was so
high. 229 The masses still supported Aristide because he represented hope for the poor
people of Haiti; but would Aristide be able to deliver to his people over the next five
years?
Starting in early 2001, hostility grew rampantly. Gérard Gourgue led more
than 1,000 members of Haiti’s disbanded military in a march through downtown Port-
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au-Prince, demanding the reestablishment of the army and Aristide’s resignation. 230
In July, men in army fatigues killed four police officers when they stormed a police
academy and police station demanding loyalty to the nonexistent army. 231 The
attackers then fled to three more towns in a central province and killed two more
policemen. The small but growing demand that the army be reconstituted reflected
the collective insecurity felt by Haitians and popular anger of the PNH’s
ineffectiveness. 232
Also in 2001, the parliamentary elections were deemed fraudulent, especially
because several elected national legislators were in the pay of the Colombian drug
cartels. In response to the fraudulent elections, a 15-party opposition alliance, called
the Democratic Convergence was formed and named Gérard Gourgue as their
symbolic provisional president. 233 The Democratic Convergence was angry because
the lack of government services and the collapsing economy, and therefore kept
pressure on Aristide to resign. 234 This is the largest opposition coalition created in
Haiti against their political leader. However, the arrests of prominent opposition
figures and attacks on their followers hurt efforts to bring the warring political
factions into agreement. 235
Despite the formation of an opposition coalition, Haitians did not feel that
their discontent was being heard. In November 2001, a general strike by the political
opposition shut down Haiti’s second larges city, Cap Haitien, and reflected unrest
230
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throughout the country. 236 A month later, armed gunmen tried to storm the
presidential palace only to be repelled by police and palace guards. At least thirteen
people were killed. 237 In support of Aristide, Brignol Lindor, the new director of
Radio Eco 2000, was stoned and hacked to death in December by a pro-Aristide
mob. 238
Faced with increasing crime, Aristide disregarded mob rule. 239 Instead,
Aristide declared that people caught committing crimes did not need to go to court to
be judged, they were just declared guilty. This “zero-tolerance for criminals”
legislation led to increased lynching and torturous crimes, but street crime dropped by
60 percent. 240 At the end of 2002, Freedom House described Haiti as not free and
was rated as a 6 out of 7 for political rights and civil liberties. 241 One major reason
for these ratings was that the country had become a dictatorship with monopolized
power and the opposition Democratic Convergence refused to cooperate with
Aristide’s efforts to create a coalition that would satisfy the reservations of the US
and OAS. Also, Haiti’s people were among the poorest in the Western Hemisphere at
this time.
In the next year, a UN force was sent to help stabilize Haiti. The UN
authorized a dispatch of 6,700 soldiers and 1,600 police. 242 On September 22, Amiot
Métayer, leader of the Gonaïves Resistance Front, was found murdered. Métayer had
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long supported Aristide but many of his followers now accused the government for
being involved in his murder. 243 Again, Aristide lost crucial support. Despite the
efforts of the UN, Freedom House did not change its ratings for Haiti’s political rights
and civil liberties from the previous year. 244 Political violence increased dramatically
as Aristide’s supporters battled opponents on a regular basis in the streets of Port-auPrince. Opposition groups continued to insist on the Aristide’s resignation and the
2004 parliamentary elections did not look promising.
In the first two months of 2004, celebrations marking 200 years of Haitian
independence are marred by violent uprisings against Aristide. Rebels seized towns
and cities and dozens of people were killed. On February 5, the Gonaïves Resistance
Front, led by Wynter Etienne, seized control of Haiti’s fourth largest city and burned
a police station, freed prisoners, killed four people, and wounded twenty in clashes
with the police. 245 The Gonaïves Resistance Front, previously called the Cannibal
Army, used to be allied with Aristide but turned on him when their leader Métayer
was murdered. 246 Other opposition leaders have also demanded Aristide’s resignation
and accused the government of incompetence and corruption. 247 Aristide refused to
step down before his term ended in 2006 and defended his government saying that it
was making progress. 248 Five days after the Gonaïves Resistance Front revolt,
government forces regained control of three of the twelve towns taken over by army
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uprisings. 249 In Cap-Haitien, Aristide loyalists roamed the streets beating and
shooting people they believed to be opposed to the president. Civic opposition
groups in Port-au-Prince led marches calling for Aristide’s resignation, but distanced
themselves from the uprisings and condemned the violence. This bloody rebellion
and pressure from the US and France forced Aristide out of power on February 29.
Aristide claimed that he was kidnapped from Haiti on a U.S. plane because he was
not told where he was going and was coerced into leaving his country. However,
U.S. representatives disagree with Aristide’s statement of kidnapping despite the truth
of U.S. transportation from Haiti. 250

Brief Analysis of the First Transition
It can be argued that Haiti did not become a true democracy during this first
transition because it was recovering from a neopatrimonial dictatorship, and it is more
common for democracies to transition from a party based authoritarian rule.
However, according to Richard Snyder, “democratization can occur in countries ruled
by neopatrimonial dictatorships after an intervening period of a more institutionalized
authoritarian rule like military dictatorship in Haiti.” 251 Haiti took an indirect
transition to democracy but still reached the same destination as other countries.
Also, this transition had several of the typical characteristics of a transition, such as a
definitive starting point when the dictator was overthrown, and an ending point of the
first democratic elections. Even though I am using the overthrow of Duvalier as the
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starting point, others may argue that the start of the transition must not begin until the
overthrow of the military rule. However, in response, I would argue that there was no
true overthrow of the government, but similar to South Africa there was a time period
when someone, or in this case the military, in power decided a democratic election
was necessary to move the country forward.
As it was briefly discussed in the introduction, Haiti failed to consolidate this
democratic transition in the oncoming years when Aristide took power. However, in
hindsight, this outcome could have been predicted because of Haiti’s economic
situation, its lack of stateness, and its high level of foreign involvement. Each of
these reversal indications in Haiti’s democratic process will be briefly explained
before continuing on with the second democratic transition.
Economy
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that there is a specific GDP
marker that a country must pass to ensure a successful democratic transition. Even
though a democracy can be initiated at any level of development, the richer the
country the greater its chances for survival. Also, if a country succeeds in generating
development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nations. 252 Through
extensive research, Przeworski and Limongi pinpointed the threshold of democracy at
$4,115 per capita income.
Haiti’s economy had been suffering for many years when it attempted its first
democratic transition and has often been labeled as the poorest nation in the Western
Hemisphere. It can be argued that ever since Haiti was forced to pay 90 million gold
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francs to France for their independence in 1825, Haiti has been financially unsound.
In 2004 Aristide tried to convince France to give Haiti reparations for this
unnecessary money transfer two centuries ago. 253 The GDP in Haiti in 1990 was
$380 per capita and about 85 percent of the population lived in absolute poverty. 254
Also, the unemployment rate has been between 50-70 percent during Aristide’s rule.
Therefore, even though Haiti was able to transition to a democracy in 1990 through
democratic elections, it was unable to sustain this democracy because it was unable to
generate enough development.
Stateness
State building is the process of building up institutions of coercion and
coordination, such as the function of bureaucracies, the identification of citizenship,
and the building up of legitimacy. According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, a
democracy is impossible until the stateness problem is resolved. 255 For Serbia and
other Baltic States, stateness was concentrated on citizenship and formation of
concrete borders. However, in Haiti the main concern is the legitimacy and proper
functioning, or lack thereof, of infrastructure and bureaucracies.
Once in power, Aristide focused on securing his own political power through
extralegal means instead of concentrating on legal institutionalization. This had many
negative effects on the progress of democratic consolidation as can be seen in the
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Freedom House analysis of Haiti in 2004. 256 First, the rule of law was extremely low.
There was no guarantee of security and justice by the police and judiciary. The
criminal justice system lacked training, and judges were often corrupt and
incompetent. Furthermore, the appointment of Calixte Delatour in October 2002 as
justice minister, who had a notorious Duvalierist past with paramilitary connections,
strained the credibility of Aristide’s commitment to equal justice. The legal
institutions did not protect Haitian citizens resulting in low legitimacy.
Another freedom that was not protected was the freedom of association. Even
though it was legally protected, opposition groups were physically suppressed.
Aristide partisans and the national police violently suppressed demonstrations.
Among those demonstrations that were violently defeated were those organized since
late 2002 by the Civil Society Group coalition of 184 opposition NGO’s.
Demonstrators were arrested and detained without trial. Opposition rallies were also
suppressed by the Company for Intervention and Maintaining Order (CIMO), a US
special force. The chimères regularly attacked and tortured protestors in mass
demonstrations especially on university campuses. Also, the poor economy
prevented few, if any, labor actions. Only 3-5 percent of the Haitian labor force was
organized in trade unions.
Furthermore, Haiti had no checks to ensure that police forces respected
citizens’ physical and psychological integrity. There was no system of redress for
rights violations and with Aristide’s ‘zero-tolerance’ policy the police ran rampant
with brutal murders.
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In order to improve the stateness of Haiti, it was recommended by Freedom
House that domestic election observers be well trained and organized. Also, political
parties need to be encouraged, strong political parties are needed to transcend the
influence of single individuals, and funds must come from a variety of people other
than the individual leader. Lastly, the government must not interfere with media. 257
Haiti became a democracy when it got rid of its dictator, but since it was a failed state
and the situation only grew worse under Aristide, it was unable to consolidate.
Foreign Involvement
Another indication for reversal was the overwhelming amount of foreign
involvement in Haiti. The United States gave millions of dollars in aid to Haiti every
year, which should have helped Haiti get back on its feet. However, the reason the
US provided so much aid was because it had a large interest in Haiti. The US
imported a lot of goods manufactured in Haitian sweatshops; therefore when Aristide
wanted to raise the minimum wage, the US became wary. Also, the US did not want
a popular democracy in Haiti because it would limit its own power in the country.
Since the US was financially invested in the country in other ways, the US had a
strong impact on Haitian rulers. If a Haitian leader did not agree with the United
States’ economic conditions, the US could threaten to dispose of the leader unless
they cooperate with US interests, which is what happened to Aristide.
The first time Aristide was elected, he did not have time to better the economy
and infrastructure of Haiti before he was exiled by the US nine months after he was
inaugurated. Aristide was the only democratically elected president to be forced into
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exile by a sovereign state. 258 Since Haiti was unable to consolidate its democracy due
to poor economy, lack of state qualities, and overwhelming foreign involvement, it
made a second attempt once Aristide was driven from power again in 2004.

2nd Transition (2004-2006)
Once Aristide was forced out of power in 2004, an interim government took
over under Boniface Alexandre. In June the first UN peacekeepers arrived to take
over security duties from the US-led force and to help flood survivors from the May
flood that killed 2,600 people. 259 September saw another flood following tropical
storm Jeanne killing nearly 3,000. Further unrest grew when levels of deadly
political and gang violence rose in the capital. Armed gangs loyal to former president
Aristide are said to be responsible for many killings. International donors pledged
more than $1 billion in aid, but this could not end all the instability in Haiti.
According to Freedom House, Haiti was labeled not free in 2004 and decreased in its
political rights ranking to 7, the lowest possible. 260 The political rights level declined
because the lack of democratically derived sovereign authority resulting from ousting
Aristide, the imposition of an ineffective interim government, and the deployment of
an international security force. Its civil liberties ranking stayed the same at 6 because
press freedom improved dramatically after the fall of Aristide despite other issues that
worsened. 261
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The year 2005 saw further unrest. In April, prominent rebel leader Ravix
Remissainthe was killed by police in the capital and hurricane Dennis killed at least
45 people in July. Freedom House levels of political rights and civil liberties
remained the same as the previous year. 262 Violence grew as the interim government
of Prime Minister Gérard Latortue and an ineffective UN peacekeeping force
struggled to move Haiti towards its first democratic election in more than five years.
More than thirty candidates sought the presidency in elections to be held in February
of the next year. Aristide was still a popular figure among the population but his
party was accused of violence. René Préval, frontrunner and former president,
benefited from an upsurge of political support from the poor. 263
On February 7, 2006 René Préval and leader of the Front For Hope party was
elected President, despite uncertain elections and popular demonstrations. Initially
the elections were not seen as complete and run-off elections were proposed.
However, Préval’s supporters took to the streets rejecting these initial results. Préval
said that fraud was being used to deny him a first-round victory. Préval won 51
percent of the vote and was declared victor after officials agreed to discount
thousands of blank ballot papers. 264 Préval promised to tackle social inequalities and
to create jobs, and even before his inauguration he visited potential donor countries in
pursuit of aid. Parliamentary elections were also successful this year and a
democratically elected government, headed by Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard
Alexis, took office.
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The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was still in
Haiti, having been there since the 2004 Haiti Rebellion. Democratic rule was
restored in 2006, but bitter divisions persisted. The economy was still in ruins,
unemployment was chronic, international aid was seen as key to recovery, and there
was a huge wealth gap between impoverished Creole-speaking black majority and the
French-speaking minority. 265 Everyone in Haiti and the world were wondering
whether Préval would be able to consolidate this newly formed democracy, unlike his
predecessor and friend Aristide several years before. According to Freedom House,
Haiti improved its democratic ratings in 2006. 266 It was now considered partly free
and increased its political rights rating to 4 and civil liberties rating to 5. Haiti
received better ratings because of the elections held for the first time in over five
years, beginning the process of establishing a democratic government. However,
street violence persisted despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping force and
additional international donor pledges of $750 million in aid. 267

Haiti in the present day (2006-2011)
Briefly, the current situation of Haiti will be discussed since the end of the
transition in 2006 to provide a background on Haiti’s present situation. The end of
2006 saw the launching of an UN-run scheme to disarm gang members in return for
grants and job training. Also, the US partially lifted its arms embargo, imposed in
1991.
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In January 2007, UN troops launched a tough new offensive against armed
gangs in Cité Soleil, one of the capital’s largest and most violent shantytowns. 268
Unfortunately, tropical storm Noel triggered mudslides and floods. 269 Préval’s
government made some progress in improving security, combating police corruption,
and stabilizing the economy, however his relations with parliament grew tense. 270
Préval also pleaded for continued international involvement and the UN agreed to
extend its peacekeeping mission until October 2008. 271 Freedom House did not
change its political rights and civil liberties rankings for Haiti in 2007, but it did
award an upward trend arrow because of improved political stability and greater
security in urban areas. 272
Food riots began in April 2008 and in response the government announced
emergency plans to cut the price of rice. Also, that same month, parliament
dismissed Prime Minister Alexis. The next month the US and World Bank
announced extra food aid totaling $30 million. In response to President Préval’s plea
for more police to help combat the wave of kidnappings-for-ransom, Brazil agreed to
boost its peacekeeping force. 273 In the early fall, three hurricanes and a tropical storm
killed 800 people and Michele Pierre-Louis succeeded Jacques-Édouard Alexis as
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prime minister. 274 Freedom House did not change its democratic ratings from the
previous year because the parliament had forced Prime Minister Alexis out of office,
then rejected Préval’s two initial nominees to replace him until Michele Pierre-Louis
was approved. 275
In May 2009, former president Bill Clinton appointed a UN special envoy to
Haiti. Also, in July the World Bank and International Monetary Fund canceled $1.2
billion of Haiti’s debt, 80 percent of the total, after judging it to have fulfilled
economic reform and poverty reduction conditions. A few months later, Pierre-Louis
was dismissed as Prime Minister because she was accused of failing to make
sufficient progress in setting Haiti on a path of economic recovery. Also, Haiti’s
senate voted to dissolve Pierre-Louis’ cabinet amid a power struggle that threatened
to undermine efforts to attract foreign investment to the country. In October, JeanMax Bellerive was appointed Prime Minister by President Préval after Pierre-Louis
was dismissed. Bellerive is trained as an economist and has experience in public
administration. He was an official in the administration of Aristide and was the
minister of planning and external cooperation under Pierre-Louis. 276 Since there
were turbulent politics in 2009 and there was a vote of no confidence by parliament to
force Pierre-Louis from prime minister, Freedom House did not change its democratic
rankings from 2008. 277
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The year 2010 was strenuous for Haiti, making it very difficult to consolidate
its democracy. First of all, a large earthquake hit Port-au-Prince in January killing
tens of thousands of people. There was also a cholera outbreak killing more than
2,500 people. 278 The presidential and parliamentary elections that were due to be
held in February were postponed until November because of the extreme social
upheaval from the earthquake. 279 In March, international donors pledge $5.3 billion
for post-quake reconstruction but popular anger grew over the slow pace of
reconstruction six months after the earthquake. 280 The November elections were
inconclusive and a second round was postponed until 2011 because of a disagreement
over which names should appear on the ballot. 281 Recently, in 2011, former president
Jean-Claude Duvalier returned from exile, and faces corruption and human rights
abuse charges.

Conclusion
Haiti has had a very tumultuous history beginning with its colonization in the
late 1600s. Controversy grew under the Duvalier leadership in the mid 1900s and
only became worse as the country tried to transition to a democracy under Aristide.
Haiti has tried twice in the past two decades to become a democracy, but has been
unsuccessful thus far during consolidation. By looking at both transitions, and the
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elite negotiations and social movements involved, it will be determined which
precondition has the most impact on a successful democracy.
The First Attempt
The first democratic transition was from 1984-1990, beginning with the
overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier by the military, and ending with the democratic
elections in 1990 with Aristide’s win. The elites and any negotiations they took part
in will be discussed first. As previously explained, the Duvaliers got rid of all
opposition leaders through killing or exile. Therefore there was no leadership or
organization among the revolutionary and moderate opposition. This opened the
doors to military rule directly after Duvalier. Even by the time of the election in
1990, there was not enough elite leadership to provide alternative options. There was
military coup after military coup during the transition and only when the civilian and
military elite faced foreign pressure, did it decide to tolerate democratic elections.
Through my research, I could not find a document or formal agreement that led to the
agreement of democratic rules or the elections. Also, there was not a strong coalition
for the elections. Aristide had support from his own party, Lavalas, and the National
Front for Change and Democracy, but this coalition soon disintegrated when Aristide
did not reward his supporters with governmental positions.
According to John Higley and Michael Burton, a political elite consists of
thousands of people who hold top positions in powerful organizations and movements
who participate in or directly influence national political decision-making. This
includes top business, government, military leaders, party, union, media, and religious
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leaders, among others. 282 Since only the military elite had any substantial input in the
outcome of the country, it was not a strong government decision because it did not
have the support of all elites.
Higley and Burton describe four types of elites. One type is a consensual
elite, which is needed to become a successful democracy. It can be argued that Haiti,
going into the 1990 democratic election, did not have a consensual elite and in fact
had a divided or disunified elite. A disunified elite is described as having violence
and distrust across factions resulting in low interpersonal relations or cooperation.
Members don’t agree to appropriate political conduct, also called the ‘rules of the
game’. Many elites fear that they will lose everything if the other party wins and
resort to extreme measures to protect themselves and their interests, including
methods of killing and imprisonment. Since there are strong barriers between factions
and few elite groups to represent the people, weak integration and narrow
differentiation lead the regime to be unstable and unrepresentative. Coups or
revolutions happen frequently and democratic processes tend to break down over
time. This describes Haiti’s political situation in 1990 very well.
It could be argued that in order for a country to become a democracy, it must
have a consensual elite. However, this is a false statement. To become a democracy
elites can fall under any of the four categories described by Higley and Burton:
disunified, ideologic, fragmented, or consensual. However, it is true that in order to
consolidate into a sturdy democracy, a consensual elite made through either elite
settlements or elite convergence is a precondition. Haiti is an example of a country
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that did not reach a consensual elite before democratic elections but was aiming
towards an elite convergence over several elections to consolidate successfully. Haiti
only had military elite representation during the first transition and therefore could
not create a full-fledged democracy in 1990. However, by having a democratic
election it bides the time for other elites to gain strength and sign on to the
government agreement of democracy. However, the elite convergence was never
completed for several reasons. One is that as the elites grew more powerful during
Aristide’s rule, more resentment grew and changes of power were frequent and
violent since they had not previously agreed to the democratic rules. Another reason
is that Aristide did not follow through with his promises of equality and economic
reform. Lastly, the United States’ intervention interfered with Haiti’s future before
any real progress could be made.
The other aspects of transitions that must be discussed are social movements.
There were very few social movements or protests during Duvalier’s rule or the
military’s interim government. During 1984-1986 the Roman Catholic Church led
several popular uprisings, which Duvalier could not contain because of his lack of
control over society. However, in comparison to South Africa and Serbia, there were
very few social movements because of the previous dictators’ control. Unlike the
other two case studies, Haiti did not need strong social movements to oust their
dictator because they had a large, foreign, superpower, the United States, to support
them in this endeavor. Therefore, foreign bodies took over most of the
responsibilities of the masses.
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Since the masses were not completely invested in ousting their previous
dictator and moving towards a democracy, it can be argued that it hurt Haiti’s future.
The Haitians were not committed and consensual to a specific goal of democracy and
therefore could not demonstrate their needs and desires to the government through
social movements or protests. Social movements, as defined by Tarrow, are
“collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in
sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” 283 During this
transition, Haitian’s did not have many social movements, which appear to be
necessary in order to create a government that is accepted by the entire population,
elites included.
The Second Attempt
The second transition was from Aristide’s exile in 2004 to the presidential
elections in 2006. The bloody Haitian rebellion and US-led power forced Aristide out
of power on February 29, 2004. For the next two years the interim government, led
by Boniface Alexandre, guided Haiti towards their first democratic elections in many
years. Haiti had had democratic elections since 1990, however many of these
elections were seen as inconclusive or fraudulent. As the 2006 elections approached
Haiti and foreign powers alike were optimistic but unsure of what the outcome would
entail.
During Aristide’s rule, Haiti’s elites could thrive with no military to suppress
them. A fifteen-party opposition alliance called the Democratic Convergence formed
against Aristide in 2001. The Democratic Convergence was angry because of the
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lack of government services and the collapsing economy, and therefore kept pressure
on Aristide to resign. 284 This was the largest opposition coalition created in Haiti
against their political leader. However, the arrests of prominent opposition figures
and attacks on their followers hurt efforts to bring the warring political factions into
agreement. 285 This coalition showed agreement between warring elites before the
2006 presidential elections.
Once the elections arrived there were more than thirty candidates of different
parties seeking the presidency. This was a drastic change in participation from
political elites especially with all thirty of them agreeing to the democratic rules and
joining the election ballot. Initially, Lavalas refused to participate in the elections
unless Aristide was allowed to finish his term in Haiti and political repression and
imprisonment of its members stopped. 286 However, Lavalas finally agreed to
participate in the elections and only won .68 percent of the votes. 287 There does not
seem to be a formal agreement between the elite groups, but elections were conducted
relatively smoothly and without fraud. It is difficult to say whether the Haitian elites
went through an elite settlement, elite convergence, or neither, before becoming a
consensual elite. However, it does appear that they were a unified elite in agreement
over democratic principles and rules before the 2006 elections.
Social movements and protests increased in Haiti during the second transition,
compared to the first democratic transition. In November 2001, a general strike by
the political opposition shut down Haiti’s second largest city, Cap Haitien, and
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reflected unrest throughout the country. In addition, protests grew into a revolution in
2004 forcing Aristide out of power, which spurred the beginning of the democratic
transition. By the masses demonstrating what kind of government they did not want,
it helped the elites and incoming leaders to formulate a new government to satisfy the
masses. Unlike the first transition, the Haitian people had responsibility in the
overthrow of their dictator and were only aided by the US and France through
international pressure for change.
The second transition was very different from the first one, which signifies
that this transition may be able to consolidate over the next several years. Natural
disasters such as the 2010 earthquake played as major setbacks in the consolidation
process by making economic development difficult and allowing unrest to grow
throughout the country. However, because there were more elites involved in this
transition and social movements played a role in the ousting of the previous dictator,
there is a good chance that Haiti will become a full-fledged democracy through this
transition or the next one if Haiti continues to improve its democratic ratings.
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Conclusion

145

One of my initial hypotheses for this thesis was that the democratic process is
more chaotic than theories depict and therefore not one single theory can be applied
to all countries. Secondly, I hypothesized that social movements, in addition to elite
negotiations, are important in the democratization process. After listing my main
conclusions, I will go through each of them in more depth. The five main
conclusions that I reached in my thesis are as follows:
1) Democratization it is not a linear process and is very difficult to follow
because of the various backgrounds and factors that can make it a success or
failure.
2) Every case study cannot completely fulfill all aspects of a theory. There is
more than one theory that can apply to each country.
3) Globalization makes democratic transitions very difficult because foreign
interests play a part in who and what type of government is installed.
4) It is very difficult to get rid of a dictator. The dictator in power must be
willing to give up his or her power to work towards a democracy with the
opposition.
5) In order for a democracy to be successful it needs involvement from both the
elite population and the average citizen. The masses need to demonstrate to
the elites what is necessary for the future government in order to gain majority
support.
6) Consensual elites and social movements are both not necessary for a
democratic transition, but the democracy will most likely succeed in the long
run if they are present. The universalists point of view is supported in this
aspect because it is possible to transition and have democratic elections
without successfully meeting preconditions first; however, the new democracy
will most likely not last without meeting certain preconditions.
My first conclusion is that democratization is not an easy process to follow,
especially when looking at complex case studies. Each individual country has a
different background, history, economy, culture, and society; therefore it is difficult
and nearly impossible to attribute one specific cause to a successful or failed
democratic transition. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence
Whitehead argue in their book Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for
Democracy that transitions from an authoritarian regime are not linear and are
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extremely uncertain. 288 Throughout history, democracies would not form in a
straightforward, stage-like progression. This reasoning is made more prominent
when looking at the case studies I chose to research; three completely different
countries in different parts of the world. Since each country has such a different
history and society, each of their experiences is different and therefore do not follow
a predetermined route of a successful transition.
My second conclusion deals with two separate issues. First concerns with the
difficulty to apply one conclusion to every case study. During my research phase on
democratic theories, in most articles and books that I read, academics made it seem
that their theories were simple and could be applied to all case studies. However, this
could not be done without concept stretching. For example, Higley and Burton argue
that in order for a democratic transition to be successful, elites need to become
consensual through one of two processes: elite settlement or general elite
convergence. They provide detailed accounts of successful and failed transitions,
based on whether or not they had a consensual or disunified elite.
When analyzing my own three case studies, Higley and Burton’s theory was
not easily applicable. The real-life application of theories is difficult and most
countries do not fit nicely into a theoretical box. By studying the elitist theories and
specific cases of elites in South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti, it is clear that it is difficult
to put real life situations into clear-cut categories. In all three case studies, there was
at least one characteristic of elite actions that could not be considered either an elite
settlement or elite convergence. For example, in South Africa, there appeared to be
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an elite settlement because all of the elite groups were consensual before the first
elections, however it took much longer than the designated time Higley and Burton
put forth as an appropriate length for an elite settlement to be successful. Therefore,
South Africa’s elite settlement was successful despite it taking several years instead
of several months.
In addition, Figure 2 demonstrates that many different theories can be applied
to my case studies but often fails to work for all three. Furthermore, by using the
Most Different Systems model, it is impossible to determine the one and only factor
that led to a success or failure for democratic transitions. It could be a culmination of
several factors that led to each success, such as elite involvement, social movements,
high economic levels, or legitimate state institutions.
My third conclusion is that globalization makes democratic transitions
difficult. Globalization has positive and negative effects on economies, societies,
cultures, and democratic progression. For example, it can have a positive impact on
cultures when individuals embrace other cultures more openly, but can also lead to
the loss of many traditions. When dealing with globalization’s impact on democratic
progression, one must take into consideration the influence strong states have on
weaker ones. The United States impact on Haiti is a great illustration of this point.
Since the US is geographically close to Haiti and has many economic interests in the
country, the US purposely destroyed Haiti’s efforts to become a democracy in the
1990s. A democratic state in Haiti would not be beneficial for the US therefore it
worked with the military and business elites to keep the country from progressing to a
representative state. By exiling Aristide and supporting the military coup, the US

148

played in important role in Haiti’s failure to consolidate its democracy. Afghanistan
is another country that has been influenced by foreign interests. They have been
forced to accept democratic values when it could be argued that its population was
not ready. It has been proven over and over that a democracy must be formed from
inside the country; outside investors will not progress a country faster or further
towards a democracy.
My fourth conclusion deals with how difficult it is to get rid of a dictator.
Most theories make it seem that once preconditions are met or when there is universal
consent to form a democracy, a democratic transition instantly begins. However, this
was not the case in Serbia and, in the very recent case, Egypt. In Serbia, Milošević
was determined to remain in power. When he could no longer rule Serbia he became
president of Yugoslavia. Student protests at the University of Belgrade, political
opposition groups, the Prudent Revolution, demonstrations, and marches went on for
years without Milošević giving up power. Finally, at the uprising on October 5, 2000,
hundreds of thousands of people stormed the government buildings and physically
forced Milošević out of power. Similarly in Egypt, protests went on for weeks
without Mubarak showing signs of stepping down. There were tens of thousands of
people in the streets of Egypt asking Mubarak to leave the presidency and allow for
democratic elections. He was resilient and had support of other dictators in the
Middle East and Northern Africa, but finally relinquished his power. Even though
the masses and opposition elites might be ready to progress to a democracy, they
must first overcome the obstacle of the present dictator or authoritarian leader who is
worried for his own life and future power.
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My last two conclusions deal with the theories of elitism and the masses. My
fifth conclusion is that social movements and the actions of the average citizen are
just as important as those of the elites, and that a country needs involvement from
both elites and the masses in order for a democracy to be successful. Recently, the
masses have been studied in more depth and academics now believe that they have
more impact on national decisions than originally perceived. Several academics,
including Sydney Tarrow and Nancy Bermeo, have been focusing on how the masses
affect national outcomes. When I began brainstorming for my thesis, I kept returning
to the Civil Rights and women’s movements in the United States in the 1960s and 70s
and how they had such a positive impact on moving the country towards a more
democratic government by extending suffrage to African Americans and women.
The masses were able to rally together and show their discontent with their present
leadership and government. They were extremely successful and led a major change
in national suffrage and protecting other basic rights. In the end, I did not use the
United States as a case study and focused on the actual transition to become a
democracy, not the consolidation phase. Through the case studies I did research, the
masses proved they were powerful by forcing their dictators out of power and
showing the elites what the public wanted in their future government. It is also vitally
important that the citizens felt they had a say in the outcome of their country and felt
connected to each other as a nation.
In both South Africa and Serbia, there were major protests and social
movements during the repressive regime, either the apartheid in South Africa or
under Milošević in Serbia. These demonstrated to the present leader and the
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opposition elites that change was inevitable and the people were not willing to
continue living under the present conditions. Social movements break down the legal,
bureaucratic, and ideological barriers allowing the movements to became ways for
ordinary people to advance collective claims against powerful opponents. Violence
from rebels and the police caused even more discontent and anger towards the regime
and resulted in national instability. These social movements and revolts demonstrated
that the masses demanded change and they would not rest until their needs were met,
which involved the ousting of their present leader and a democratic election.
Haiti is an interesting case because it shows what happens to a country when
the masses do not partake in social movements and other mass actions. During the
first transition, Haitians were still oppressed by the government and military,
therefore social movements and protests were not used very widely and brutally
suppressed by the armed forces. Haiti was still able to get rid of Duvalier because of
the United States involvement, but foreign involvement can be seen as a disadvantage
to Haiti in the long run. The Haitians were not able to show their commitment to
democracy, if they were in fact committed, during the first transition so they were
unable to gather support for this endeavor. In addition, they did not demonstrate their
needs and desires to the government through social movements or protests so the new
government that formed did not know exactly what the masses expected from their
leaders. The first transition was successful, but the new democracy failed to
consolidate.
By the time the second transition began in 2004, Haiti had had more time to
grow and develop. Social movements and protests had increased since the first
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transition. The masses were in fact the ones who forced Aristide out of power to
begin the democratic transition. Since the masses demonstrated their needs and
expectations for the government, the elites were able to formulate a government that
could satisfy the masses. Social movements are important before the transition to
show the present dictators or authoritarian leaders that the people had had enough and
were willing to put their lives on the line for a better future. However, the importance
of social movements does not end once the oppressive leader is out of power; the
masses must continue demonstrating their ideas and beliefs to make sure the new
government evolves into what the public wants. Since they have not been
democratically represented in the past, they have no way to show their leaders what
they require other than by taking to the streets.
In all three of these cases, South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti, not only were there
peaceful social movements, there was also physical violence leading to political
instability and the necessary change in power. Between peaceful movements and
violent protests a change of power was necessary and elites had to act in order to keep
some power, and democracy was often an inviting option. In addition, all three
countries support Nancy Bermeo’s argument that extremist mobilization can in fact
foster the discussion of democratization, not hinder the process like many academics
believe. 289 Social movements and riots grew to such an extent in Serbia that
government buildings were taken by storm on foot and by bulldozers. Instead of
halting the transition, it encouraged the country to move forwards in solidarity
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towards a better future. If the masses were held back and their actions moderated,
Serbia might not have begun their transition in 2000.
Social movements are also extremely important because they verify the
unification of the people towards a common goal and raise the people’s feeling of
self-importance in their country. In order for a democracy to be functional, the
majority of the population must be involved in voting for their representatives and
also play an integral role in local politics. If the people do not rally together before
the democratic government is solidified, it will be more likely the government will
fail because the people do not realize their own importance in their new government
and country. Through the research performed, it is clear that both social movements
and elites influence transitions and that the combination enable countries to be
successful.
My sixth and final conclusion is that consensual elites and social movements
are both not necessary for a democratic transition, but a new democracy will most
likely succeed in the long run if they are present. The debate that I focused on in this
thesis is whether the elites have all the influence in national decisions such as
transitioning to a democracy or if the masses have a large influence as well. Figure 2
illustrates these conclusions.
It is made clear through the case studies I researched that elites are very
important in democratic transitions. In South Africa, the two most prominent elite
parties led by Nelson Mandela and De Klerk worked together for years to come to an
agreement to follow democratic rules and who would have power. In Serbia, the
opposition elites to Milošević’s presidency began negotiating many years before the
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transition started through the formation of coalitions. The elites were considered
consensual by the end of the transition period and worked under democratic rules
despite personal disagreements.
Both South Africa and Serbia had consensual elites when entering their first
democratic elections making it seem that a country needs consensual elites to become
a democracy. However, Haiti’s democratic experience demonstrates that this is not
true, and that a consensual elite is only needed to consolidate, not to have a successful
democratic transition. Haiti’s first transition did not have many elites negotiating
because Duvalier had seen to it that all opposition elites were not a threat to his rule.
Therefore, only military elites were present, thus the military coup and reign during
the transition phase. Since not many elites were available for initial negotiations,
when they began to gain power during Aristide’s rule they showed their discontent,
which was one factor that resulted in Haiti’s failure to consolidate its democracy. By
the second transition in the 2000s, the elites were able to gain power and support
during Aristide’s terms and all thirty parties agreed to the democratic rules and to be
part of the election ballot in the 2006 elections. So far, Haiti has still had difficulty
consolidating its democracy, but not as much from internal strife from elites as from
natural disasters.
In all three of these cases, elites have played an important role in the
democratic transitions, but more significantly in the consolidation phase. Elites do
not have to be consensual to become a democracy and a democratic election can
happen even if the elites are still disunified or not represented at all, like in Haiti.
However, it is much more likely that a democracy will be successful in the long term
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if the elites become consensual either before the democratic elections through an elite
settlement, or over several elections through an elite convergence.
Because I used MDS-SO, it is almost impossible to determine the cause of
success in these three countries because it can be attributed to many factors.
Therefore, it cannot be concluded if it is elites or social movements that are needed
for a successful transition since in the cases of both a successful transition and
progressive consolidation, South Africa and Serbia, the countries had both a
consensual elites and presence of social movements. However, it can be stated that
consensual elites and social movements are not necessary for a democratic transition
to be successful, but can predict the success of the consolidation phase. Second, it
can be concluded that the presence of elites and social movements come hand in hand
with each other; if there is enough freedom in the country to have elite representation
there is also enough freedom to allow social movements and mass protests, and vise
versa.
Elites and the masses are important, but not necessary to become a
democracy. This follows the universalist view that any country can become a
democracy through democratic elections if there enough motivation and desire, but in
order to sustain the democracy and consolidate, the country must reach certain
preconditions such as high economic level, stateness, consensual elites, and
involvement of the masses. In the theories discussed, it must be specified whether the
preconditions were for countries to transition to a democracy by having democratic
elections, or to sustain a democracy over a certain number of years through
consolidation. Also, it is important to emphasize Sheri Berman’s argument that
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young democracies today, including South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti, are weak,
ineffectual, illiberal, or violent because it is a painstakingly long process that is not
linear. 290 It took France 150 years to become a democracy so it is important that we
do not discourage countries that do not follow a gradual, liberal path to democracy.
My study has obvious flaws because of my short time-span to do research and
the lack of resources available. One important fact to understand is that every one of
these case studies is still working to consolidate. Therefore, even though they had
successful transitions, measured by having a successful democratic election, they
could still fail as a democracy in the future before they fully consolidate. Also, it is
undecided when a country has fully consolidated; it may be an ongoing process for all
democracies.
One way to advance this study is to look at several countries that have a similar
background, for example post-communist Europe countries, that have different
outcomes, either successful or failed democratic transitions. Another option for
picking case studies are countries that have gone through more than one transition
attempts, have strong elite involvement, but lack involvement of the masses. The
dependent variable would be the presence of elite negotiations, and the independent
variable would be the presence of social movements, for both successful and failed
transitions. This way, it could be determined if indeed social movements can be
considered a determining factor for successful transitions. However, it could be the
case that there are not enough situations with similar backgrounds to enable this
study.
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Figure 1: Serbian and Yugoslavian Leaders
Date
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

President
Milosevic - May 8,1989- July 23, 1997 [League
of Communists of Yugoslavia, then switches to
Socialist Party of Serbia]
• The pan-Yugoslav League of
Communists of Yugoslavia was
dissolved in January 1990 into 6
political parties (one for each
republic), in Serbia that was the
Socialist Party of Serbia
• April 28, 1992 Yuguslavia dissolved
entirely, Serbia and Montenegro
entered into a new union

2001

2003

Nikola Šainović – February 10, 1993 – March
18, 1994 [Socialist Party of Serbia]
Mirko Marjanović – March 18, 1994 – October
24, 2000 [Socialist Party of Serbia]
• Forced to resign after the Bulldozer
Revolution

Dragan Tomic - July 23, 1997 – December 29,
1997 [Socialist Party of Serbia]
Milan Milutinović - December 29, 1997 –
December 29, 2002 [Socialist Party of Serbia]

2000

2002

Prime Minister
Stank Radmilović December 5, 1989 – January
15, 1991 [Leauge of Communists of Yugoslavia
then Socialist Party of Serbia]
Dragutin Zelenović – January 15, 1991 –
December 23, 1991 [Socialist Party of Serbia]
Radoman Božović – December 23, 1991 –
February 10, 1993 [Socialist Party of Serbia]

Natasa Mićić (acting president) - December 30,
2002 – February 4, 2004 [Civic Alliance of
Serbia]

President of Serbia/Montenegro
Was Yugoslavia

Dobrica Ćosić – June 15, 1992 – June 1, 1993
[Independent]
Zoran Lilić – June 25, 1993 – June 25, 1997
[Socialist Party of Serbia]

Slobadan Milošević – July 23, 1997 – October
7, 2000 [Socialist Party of Serbia]
• March 31, 2001 – was arrested

Milomir Minić – October 24, 2000 – January
25, 2001 [Socialist Party of Serbia]
• Interim after Marjanovic’s resignation
Zoran Đinđić – January 25, 2001 – March 12,
2003 [Democratic Party – Democratic
Opposition of Serbia]
• Part of Democratic Opposition of
Serbia coalition
• Assassinated by members of the
Special Operations Unit and the
Serbian mafia
Nebojša Čović (acting)– March 12-2003 –
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Vojislav Koštunica – October 7, 2000-March 7,
2003 [Democratic Party of Serbia

Svetozar Marović – March 7, 2003 – June 3,

2004

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Dragan Maršićanin - February 4, 2004 – March
3, 2004 (acting president) [Democratic Party of
Serbia]
Vojislav Mihailović (acting president) - March
3, 2004 – March 4, 2004 [Serbian Renewal
Movement]
Predrag Marković (acting presiden) - March 4,
2004 – July 11, 2004 [G17+]
Boris Tadić - July 11, 2004 – present
[Democratic Party]

March 17, 2003 [Democratic Alternative]
• Part of Democratic Opposition of
Serbia coalition
Žarko Korać – March 17, 2003 – March 18,
2003 [Social Democratic Party]
• Part of Democratic Opposition of
Serbia coalition
Zoran Živković – March 18, 2003 – March 3,
2004 [Democratic Party]
• During term, the Democratic
Opposition of Serbia was disbanded
leading to new elections
Vojislav Koštunica – March 3, 2004 – July 7,
2008
• 2 terms, switched in late 2007
• first ended due to constitutional reform
and later because of DS-DSS schism
of SAA treaty
• Kostunica became first prime minister
of independent Serbia during his first
term

Mirko Cvetković – July 7, 2008 – Present
[Independent]
• Endorsed by the For a European Serbia
coalition led by the Democratic Part
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2006 [Democratic Party of Socialists of
Montenegro]
• State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
dissolved on June 5, 2006

Figure 2: Theory Application to Case Studies
Theory
Preconditionalism: a democracy
cannot emerge until a country
meets certain conditions or
experiences
• Stateness: a country must
build up institutions of
coercion and coordination,
such as the function of
bureaucracies, the
identification of citizenship,
the building up of
legitimation, and creation of
distinct state borders.
• Culture: It is important to
construct a strong and
cohesive national identity
among the population,
especially in a multi-ethnic
area.
• Economic Level: a country
must have at least $4,115 per
capita income
• Elites: elites are the sole
influence for national
decisions

Haiti (1st transition 1984-1990,
2nd transition 2004-2006)
Did not reach any preconditions
for the 1990 election but was still
able to form a democracy

South Africa (transition 19901994)

Serbia (transition 2000-2006)

√ Stateness was not considered an
issue in South Africa. They had
enough legitimacy in the states
institutions.

√ Serbia and many other postcommunist countries in Eastern
Europe had to improve the
legitimacy of their state
institutions, define citizenship,
and define their borders, before
they could become a democracy.
Succeeded.

Haiti did not improve the
legitimacy of their institutions
before either elections in 1990 and
2006.

√ Conflict between blacks and
whites. Mandela worked to reduce
the fears of whites by having De
Klerk stay as his Vice President.

√ Difficult to create a national
identity because Serbia kept
changing its borders, but once
Yugoslavia broke up Serbia was
able to formulate a national
identity.
GDP per capita in 2006:
$3,453.28 292

Conflict between whites, mulattos,
and blacks.

√ Every political party, including
Milosevic’s, agreed to participate
in elections.

1990: only military elites were in
existence
√ 2006: all political parties,

GDP per capita in 1994: $3,546.67
291

√ Elite negotiations between
Mandela, De Klerk, and the rest of
the political parties before the

291

NationMaster.com. “Economy Statistics: GDP (per capita) (1994) by Country.” Accessed on 28 February 2011.
NationMaster.com. “Economy Statistics: GDP (per capita) (2006) by Country.” Accessed on 28 February 2011.
293
NationMaster.com. “Economy Statistics: GDP (per capita) (1990) by Country.” Accessed on 28 February 2011.
294
NationMaster.com. “Economy Statistics: GDP (per capita) (2006) by Country.” Accessed on 28 February 2011.
292
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1990 GDP per capita: $416.99
2006 GDP per capita: $573.70

293
294

elections
•

Masses: the masses have a
strong influence in national
outcomes

√ Social movements and violence
during apartheid forced De Klerk to
work with Mandela to create a
democracy

Universalists: any country can
become a democracy as long as
they are persistent; their actions are
more important than meeting
certain preconditions.
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√ Many social movements,
protests, and revolts – got rid of
Milosevic by storming
government buildings.

including Aristide’s Lavalas,
participated in elections
1990: no strong social
movements, all suppressed by
police
√ 2006: many social movements
and forced Aristide out of power
by a revolt
√ Haiti was able to become a
democracy, but not consolidate it.

